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ABSTRACT 
A new methodology is proposed for integrating planetary quarantine 
objectives into space exploration planning. This methodology is designed 
to remedy the major weaknesses inherent in the current formulation of 
planetary quarantine requirements. Application of the new methodology 
is illustrated by a tutorial analysis of a proposed Jupiter Orbiter 
mission. 
Present NASA methods express planetary quarantine requirements in 
the fo','1lt of maximum probability of contamination constraints; nominal 
mission plans are then designed to meet these requirements. With the 
advent of complex missions of long duration, this method is increasingly 
felt to be inadequate and often too restrictive. It offers no assurance 
of reaching an adequate balance among numerous mission objectives, and 
it does not provide rational decision criteria should a mission flight 
depart from its nominal plan. 
The proposed methodology reformulates planetary quarantine planning 
as a sequential decision problem. Rather than concentrating on a nominal 
plan, all decision alternatives and possible consequences are laid out in 
a decision tree. Probabilities and values are associated with the out-
comes, including the outcome of contamination. The process of allocating 
probabilities, which could not be made perfectly unambiguous and system-
atic, is replaced by decomposition and optimization techniques based on 
widely known principles of dynamic progrannning. Thus, the new methodology 
provides logical integration of all available information and allows se-
lection of the best strategy consistent with quarantine and other space 
expl01'ation goals. 
Ideally, the values (or penalties) associated with planetary con-
tamination should be assessed by an international body such as CaSPAR. 
In the meantime, contamination penalties can be inferred through a simple 
iterative process to obtain optimal strategies compatible with probability 
constraints imposed on projects. These inferred penalties are useful sig-
nals for coordinating the assignment of current probability constraints. 
A Jupiter Orbiter mission has been selected to illustrate the new 
methodology. A tutorial analysis of the insertion maneuver into Jupiter 
orbit demonstrates how realistic elements can be taken into account. A 
preliminary examination of the remainder of the mission has revealed two 
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major unresolved issues. One is finding a safe method for disposing of 
the spacecraft at the end of the multiple-encounter exploration phase, 
assuming that the spacecraft remains under control. The other is finding 
an emergency disposal system if control of the spacecraft trajectory is 
partially lost during the exploration phase. The resolution of both 
issues '.ill require a careful assessment of the probabilities of con-
tamination given impact on Jupiter and its satellites. 
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1 THE REPORT IN BRIEF 
1.1 Objectives of the Report, Methodological Findings 
and Recommendations 
We have examined in this report the concern over planetary contamina-
tion, critically reviewed its expression in NASA's planetary quarantine 
policy, and identified the weaknesses of current implementation practices, 
particularly as they apply to the optimization of mission guidance deci-
sions. A new methodology and analytical procedures that avoid these 
weaknesses are proposed, and are illustrated using a Jupiter Orbiter (JO) 
mission. 
Although present procedures have served a useful purpose for planning 
early planetary exploration missions, there is no assurance that they can 
determine optimal strategies for the more complex missions contemplated 
in the 1980s. These procedures, which assign maximum permissible proba-
bilities of contamination--called probability suballocations--to various 
mission events, have two major shortcomings. 
(1) Trade-offs between quarantine and other "pace exploration 
objectives remain implicit. It is therefore difficult 
to take into account new information, including that 
obtained during the mission, in developing mission 
strategies. 
(2) There is no systematic means of allocating probabilities 
of contamination to events of a complex mission, and 
therefore no assurance that a set of suballocations will 
lead to an optimal strategy. 
The proposed methodology is designed to alleviate these weaknesses; 
it represents a next logical step in the evolution of planetary quarantine 
planning. 
Our major recommendation is that planetary quarantine planning be 
reformulated as a sequential decision problem. In such a form, it may 
be addressed by systematic decomposition and optimization techniques 
based on widely known dynamic programming principles. 
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Such reformulation requires that (1) a tree of decision alternatives 
and possible consequences be laid out, (2) probabilities be associated 
with consequences, and (3) values be assigned to ultimate outcomes. 
Where explicit values are not available, as, for example, with contamina-
tion penalties, it may be possible to infer them from probability con-
straints. These values can be applied systematically to the determination 
of optimal strategies. In the future, however, all values, and in partic-
ular contamination penalties, should be established directly by NASA and 
perhaps ultimately by an international body such as COSPAR. 
In a direct assessment of contamination penalties, it is possible 
to take into account characteristics of the planet, the contaminating 
agent, and the extent of contamination. Having these values would bring 
a greater consistency to the determination of optimal mission strategies 
and space exploration programs. 
1.2 Current Issues in Planetary Quarantine Planning 
1.2.1 The Evolution of Planetary Exploration 
Planetary exploration has evolved from the first Mars and Venus 
fly-bys of the early 1960s to ever more complex missions such as orbiters, 
landers, and now multiple-encounter missions. The recent successes of 
Mariner 10, which flew by Venus and Mercury, and Pioneer 11, which is 
now ell route from Jupiter to Saturn, have demonstrated the feasibility 
and the potential of this new method of space exploration. The naviga-
tional concept is to use the gravitational assistance of one celestial 
body during a close fly-by to send a spacecraft toward another body. 
Thus the massive planet Jupiter may be used as a key relay for the ex-
ploration of more distant outer planets that would otherwise require 
enormous quantities of fuel and extremely long flight durations. 
These advanced missions pose new planning problems. Many guidance 
and control decisions must be made during flights that may last for years. 
During this time, information is being obtained about the state of the 
spacecraft, its trajectory, and the region of space being explored. To 
take full advantage of this information, contingency plans must be de-
veloped encompassing the variety of events that may take place. 
1.2.2 Planetary Quarantine in Mission Planning 
Two fundamental goals of NASA's planetary program are to search 
for the origin of life and to understand the formation of the solar 
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system. The discovery of extraterrestrial life, whether it be like that 
on Earth or different, would indeed be of the greatest interest to biol-
ogists and others. However, this search might be compromised by careless-
ness in early space ventures. 
Viable terrestrial organisms deposited on another life-bearing 
planet might create rapid and profound changes in that planet's biology 
before sophisticated life detection experiments could be carried out. 
Furthermore, results from life detection experiments might be hopelessly 
confused if terrestrial life forms were discovered without the assurance 
that they had not been brought from Earth by accident. In a more distant 
future, attempts at controlling the development of an exobiology might 
be jeopardized if contamination by undesirable terrestrial organisms had 
already taken place. 
Caution must therefore be exercised in man's exploration of the 
solar system lest one important object of the inquiry be destroyed in 
the search process. The crux of the problem is to define a criterion 
to distinguish between cautious and careless exploration. 
1.2.3 Current Planetary Quarantine Planning Practice 
For most missions, the risk of contamination cannot be eliminated 
entirely (absolute sterilization is as unfeasible as absolute reliability), 
so a compromise is made. A maximum probability of contamination, known 
as the mission allocation, is set, and the mission planner must demon-
strate that this upper limit will not be exceeded. 
Current procedures consist of analyzing the potential sources of 
contamination and making probability suballocations, based on the mission 
allocation, for each of them. For instance, in a typical fly-by mission, 
contamination may be caused by accidental impact of the sp.acecraft or by 
ejecta flux. An impact of the spacecraft can be attributed to the failure 
of one of the guidance maneuvers, which can in turn be attributed to 
another failure, and so forth. Then, based implicitly on the relative 
difficulty and importance of each maneuver for the success of the mission, 
a maximum probability of contamination is assigned to each potential 
source of contamination. This allocation process is often limited to 
one sequence of guidance maneuvers and likely consequences, Le., a 
nominal mission plan. Moreover, in many simple mission plans there is 
a one-to-one correspondence between a guidance decision and a resulting 
probability of contamination; hence, the widespread but sometimes con-
fusing habit bf conSidering probabilities of contamination asdeciSiorr 
variables. 
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1.2.4 The Need for Revision of Planetary Quarantine Plans 
Some mission planners have indicated that the suballocation proce-
dure is inadequate and may be too restrictive, especially ,.here it is 
limited to a nominal plan. The actual development of most complex mis-
sions will not follow the nominal plan. Hypotheses or circumstances under 
which the mission contamination analysis originally was conducted will 
become obsolete. Contamination-related outcomes will become kno,.u as the 
mission proceeds, and since the probability of contamination associated 
with each potential source was very small to start with, the impression 
will be most of the time that expected (planned) risks of contamination 
are being avoided and that the nominal case probability suballocations 
for the rest of the mission could be relaxed. 
The question often raised by mission planners is how to revise the 
contamination analysis and, if necessary, modify the probability suballo-
cations during a flight. The nominal plan is supposed to lead to the 
most valuable mission that still satisfies the planetary quarantine re-
quirements under nominal conditions. But to provide optimal results 
under all foreseeable circumstances, new procedures are needed that can 
assess probabilities of contamination conditional upon those circumstances. 
The same question could be raised at higher levels in the decision 
hierarchy for space exploration. At the space program level, should 
mission allocations be revised to take into account the results of earlier 
missions, and if so, how? At the international level, should scientists 
revise the planetary quarantine policy as a result of new technological 
develo~ments and ne,. advances in scientific knowledge, and if so, how? 
Although the revision procedures would vary in practice from one decision 
level to another, the same conceptual framework should apply. The con-
ceptual framework must be based on a clear interpretation of the concept 
of probability and the issue of planetary contamination. 
1.3 Weaknesses of a Probability Constraint Formulation 
as a Basis for Planetary Quarantine Planning 
The scientific community expressed concern over possible interplane-
tary contamination before the space exploration program began. Thus, 
planetary quarantine research was initiated at an early stage and an 
international agreement was achieved to insure that future planetary 
explorations would not be compromised by carelessness or oversight during 
the first missions. The remarkable results obtained by missions flown 
to date, with very small probabilities of contamination, demonstra.te the 
usefulness and the sensibility of this early agreement. 
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However, the use of probability constraints to implement quarantine 
policy has fundamental weaknesses. In the past, these weaknesses may 
have had retatively minor effect. In a mission to a single planet, COn-
sisting of a small number of guidance maneuvers in a nominal plan, other 
mission values such as fly-by altitude and fuel conservation could be 
taken into account mOre or less intuitively. For gravity-assisted 
multiple-encounter missions of long duration,the intera;;!tion between 
quarantine considerations and other space exploration objectives will 
be conSiderably more complex. For these missions, the weaknesses in a 
probability constraint formulation may be a serious liability in mission 
planning. 
The three fundamental weaknesses in the probability constraint 
formulation are: 
(1) Implicit Value Judgments--Trade-offs between quarantine 
and other space exploration objectives are implicitly 
rather than explicitly stated. It is difficult to see 
how information on planetary science, spacecraft capa-
bility, mission achievements, or future programs is 
brought into the planning process when the basis for 
establishing the quarantine constraint is not evident. 
Of necessity, the maximum acceptable probability of 
contaminating a planet during the period of biological 
exploration now represents a value judgment. Its just.i-
fication must be as follows: 
(a) A smaller probability of contamination would ent'l.il 
an unacceptable increase in the cost of exploration 
or would curtail projects that remain of interest 
despite their associated risks of contamination. 
(b) A larger probability of contamination is not accept-
able even though it may permit mission cost reduc-
tions or additions of valuable exploration projects. 
Therefore, a set of possible planetary exploration programs 
and a trade-off between the value of these programs and 
the risks of contamination must be implicit in the plane-
tary quarantine policy. Explicitly stated trade-offs 
would be a better guide for selecting specific missions 
within a space exploration program than the specification 
of a maximum allowable probability of contamination for a 
planet or satellite. 
(2) Negative Value to Resolving Uncertainty--Theuse of 
probability constraints can lead to a conclusion that 
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further information to resolve uncertainty about con-
tamination has a negative vlue. This conclusion con-
tradicts the basic, common sense assumption that more 
information ,~ill improve rather than degrade the plan-
ning process, and its logical extension suggests that. 
it might be t;ortht;hile to suppress information that 
could sho,~ the constraint t;ill be violated. 
(3) Ambiguous Method of Allocation--The procedure for allo-
cating the probability constraint among missions in a 
program, or guidance decisions within a mission, is 
ambiguous and allot;s for varying interpretations. 
Furthermore, the definition of probability suballoca-
tions may be ambiguous, allot;ing for several interpre-
tations. 
1.4 The Proposed Net; Methodology 
1.4.1 Principle and Scope 
Although current procedures have served a useful purpose, t;e be-
lieve that a net; methodology is needed to insure that planning for complex 
future missions is soundly formulated. The net; methodology should be 
applicable to all contamination-related decisions at all levels of the 
planetary quarantine program. We believe that, to that end, NASA's proce-
dures should be reformulated in terms of explicit values (e.g., scientific 
values, and contamination penalties) rather than probability constraints. 
Ideally, the values should be set expJ.icitly by an international body 
such as caSPAR. HOt;ever, to be immedi~tely useful to mission planners, 
the net; methodology must be applicable in the context of current NASA 
quarantine procedures, t;hich use probability constraints. 
We therefore propose the follot;ingmethodology: 
(1) Probability Consistency--To use the consistency con-
ditions inherent in probability theory to assess and 
revise probabilities, including the probabilities of 
contamination. 
(2) Decision Formulation--To define decision sequences for 
projects (or missions or programs) and reformulate 
planetary quarantine planning as a sequential decision 
problem, t;hich can then be addressed by appropriate 
optimization pr.ocedures. 
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(3) Iterative Reconciliation--To use a simple iterative 
process to obtain an optimal strategy compatible with 
the probability constraints imposed on the project. 
This methodology assures logical integration of the available 
information and consistent decision making within projects. It also 
assures compatibility of the optimal strategy with the probability con-
straints imposed upon each project. In addition, while probability con-
straints are imposed upon projects, the method provides useful signals 
for coordinating these constraints among projects. 
1.4.2 The Relation Bet,,,een Probability Constraints 
and Value Assessments 
The essential departure from the current procedu~e is that no 
probability suballocations are necessary; rather, values must be assigned 
to the various possible outcomes of a project, including that of contamina-
tion. 
As '''e have seen, the assessment of a probability constraint re-
quires an implicit judgment: a trade-off between expected value in 
meeting scientific and other goals of space exploration and the proba-
bility of contaminating planets or satellites of biological interest. 
It is this trade-off that we believe should be addressed by NASA policy 
maker~ and the concerned scientific community. The assessment may be 
conveniently made in terms of a ,iollar value, applicable perhaps only 
to a range of probabilities below some threshold. 
The situation is in many respects parallel to that of assigning 
a value to human life in the context of decisions on automobile or air-
craft safety. This value is useful for making trade-offs in a consistent 
way between small probabilities of loss of life and the increased costs 
imposed by automobile seat belts, improved aircraft navigation systems, 
and similar safety measures. It would be improper to assert that the 
value of, life used in this context represents an amount an individual 
would pay to avoid certain death. Similarly, it would be improper to 
assert that the contamination penalty used in the context of a contamina-
tion analysis represents an amount SOCiety would pay to avoid certain 
planetary contamination. 
We find using an explicit penalty preferable because it permits 
the weaknesses in an allocation approach to be avoided. The process of 
allocating probabilities, which cannot be made unambiguous and systematic,
 
is replaced by decomposition and optimization techniques using widely 
known principles of dynamiC programming. This permits selection of the 
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best mission or program strategy consistent with quarantine and other 
space exploration goals. New information may be easily incorporated in 
this formulation, and complex sequential strategies or contingency plans 
may be assessed and evaluated. 
1.5 Application to a Jupiter Orbiter Mission 
1.5.1 Objective and Scope 
A Jupiter Orbiter (JO) mission offers a particularly appropriate 
opportunity to apply the proposed methodology. From a planetary quaran-
tine point of view, the mission seems unprecedented. The spacecraft will 
repeatedly fly by several celesti.al bodies that, although not well-known, 
are considered of potential biological interest.* 
For analysis, the mission can be di"ided into three phases: a 
maneuver to insert the spacecraft into Jupiter orbit, a multiple-encounter 
exploratory phase, and a disposal phase. 
The first phase has been used for a tutorial application of the 
proposed methodology. It is treated as a complete mission consisting of 
a single fly-by of Ganymede. The focus is on determining an optimal 
fly'-by altitude that will be low enough for fuel conservation but not so 
low as to cause excessive danger of contamination. The analysis does 
not pretend to solve the problem; rather it demonstrates how realistic 
elements can be taken into account with the new methodology. 
1.5.2 Major Findings with Respect to a JO Mission 
There are two major unresolved issues with the mission designs 
and strategies that have been proposed to date. One is how to dispose 
of the spacecraft at the end of the multiple-encounter exploration phase, 
assuming that the spacecraft remains under control. The second is how 
to dispose of the spacecraft if control of its trajectory is lost during 
the exploration phase. In that case, the spacecraft is nearly certain 
to impact one of the major bodies in the Jovian system sometime during 
the period of planetary quarantine. Given the current estimates of 
* The biological interest of the Galilean .satellites has not yet been de-
fined. Recent guidelines proposed by the NASA Planetary Quarantine 
Office indica'te strict quarantine policy is under consideration [1]. 
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spacecraft reliability and present assessments of the probability of 
contamination if the spacecraft impacts one of the Galilean satellites, 
the probability of contamination of the JO mission exceeds by far the 
contemplated mission allocation. 
The contamination analysis for the multiple-encounter exploration 
phase can be summarized in a single approximate expression for the proba-
bility of contamination: 
P(C) (
Probability of failure ) 
= and consequently of impact x Pc (1-1) 
where 
P(C) = probability of contamination 
Pc = probability of contamination given impact. 
The probability of failure being small compared to 1 is approxi-
mately equal to the sum of the probabilities of failure at each encounter. 
Failure at each encounter can, in turn, be decomposed into failure of 
the main propulsion system (probability f) and failure of an emergency 
maneuver t:J correct the trajectory (probability q) if the fly-by maneuver 
sets the spacecraft on an impact course (probability Pi); that is, 
(
Probability of failure) _. 
- f + p,q 
at each encounter 1. 
Assuming for simplicity that the exploration phase consists of 
encounters, the probability of contamination during this phase 
fore be written as 
P(C) = n(f + p,q) 
l. 
(1-2) 
n similar 
can there-
(1-3) 
It would be desirable to perform up to 50 encounters without 
taking a risk of contamination much greater than 5 X 10-5 (risks of 
contamination will als.o be incurred during the insertion maneuver and 
the standard disposal maneuver). Therefore, the product (f + Piq)Pc 
must be limited to approximately 10-6• 
The probability of contamination following the execution of a retarget-
ing maneuver, Piq, can be made much smaller than f. Therefore, the two 
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critical parameters are the main propulsion system reliability and the 
probability of contamination given impact. Their product must be less 
than 1 X 10-6• 
1.5.3 Assessment of the Probability of Contamination Given Impact 
The first major task will be to improve the assessment of the 
probability of contamination given impact and, if possible, to reduce 
this probability. 
The probability of contamination given impact depends essentially 
on two factors: the total number of viable terrestrial organisms (VTOs) 
that may be released on a planet and the probability of growth, Pg' of 
these organisms on the planet. Assuming that each VTO has an independent 
probability Pg of survival, the probability of contamination given impact 
can be calculated as 
* Pc = Np (as long as Np < 1) g g 
However, at the other extreme, a complete dependence assumption 
made: All VTOs will either survive with probability Pg or die. 
case, the probability of contamination given impact is 
could be 
In that 
which is usually a much smaller probability (typical values of N may 
range from 103 to 106). 
Quarantine planning for a JO mission may require careful modeling 
of factors affecting the probability of contamination given impact. 
1.5.4 The Need for an Emergency Disposal System 
Current estimates of the main propulsion system reliability range 
from 10-2 to 10-4 • It does not seem possible to improve this reliability 
* This equation is the usual Sagan-Coleman formula. 
this formula and its limitations, see Judd, North, 
10 
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and Pezier [2]. 
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to the point «here the planetary quarantine requirement «ould be met. 
Given that current estimates of Pc are close to 1 for the Galilean satel-
lites, an emergency disposal system therefore seems necessary. 
It is beyond the scope of this study to try to characterize such 
a system; ho«ever it should meet some strict design specifications. In 
particular, the emergency disposal system should have (1) a probability 
of failure of 10-4 or better, and (2) given that it functions, a result-
ing probability of contamination for subsequent events not exceeding 10-4 .* 
* See derivation on page 94, and Figure 4.11, page 95. 
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2 A CRITICAL REVIEW OF CURRENT PROCEDURES FOR PLANETARY 
QUARANTINE PLANNING 
2.1 Plan of the Review 
The scientific community expressed a concern over possible planetary 
contamination several years before actual planetary explorations were 
undertaken. In these days, little was known about the decontamination 
and sterilization techniques that could be used on spacecraft hardware. 
Likewise, the goals and possibilities of planetary exploration ~~ere only 
vaguely defined. Under these circumstances, scientists first wanted to 
require absolute sterilization. However, it was quickly recognized that 
such a requirement would be inoperative and that a small probability of 
contamination would have to be accepted if planetary exploration were to 
be allowed. Planetary quarantine planning procedures were then developed 
on the concept of a maximum permissible probability of contamination. 
The purpose of Section 2.2 is to review the evolution of planetary 
quarantine planning procedures in order to develop an understanding of 
the present system. Ive will show, in particular, how the use of maximum 
permissible probabilities of contamination has affected the planning 
process. 
Unfortunately, this historical development has led to a danger of 
confusion about the concept of probability; in particular, it has raised 
ambiguities about the correct interpretation of probability allocations. 
Section 2.3 will review the concept of probability and the consistency 
rules of probability theory as they apply to the assessment and revision 
of contamination probabilities. 
For simple missions, an experienced planner could probably avoid 
the difficulties inherent in the current planning procedures and deter-
mine mission strategieB that would be optimal for all practical purposes. 
With the complex missions contemplated for the 1980s, such an outcome 
becomes very unlikely. Intuition and judgment will usually be inadequate 
to trace the consequences of multiple guidance maneuvers and to apply 
consistent trade-offs between multiple mission objectives. It becomes 
crucial to found planetary quarantine procedures on logically sound con-
ceptual bases and systematic optimization techniques. Section 2.4 out-
lines the elements required to develop such planning procedures. 
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2.2 The Evolution of NASA's Planetary Quarantine Policy 
2.2.1 From Sterilization to Planetary Quarantine 
The first formal NASA policy for preventing lunar and planetary 
contamination can be found in letters written by Dr. Abe Silverstein, 
then director of space flight programs, in October 1959. These letters, 
addressed to major NASA subcontractors, all stated that payloads that 
might impact a celestial body must be sterilized before launching. 
It «as not long before the £easibility of this statement «as 
questioned and the need to make some allOloance for a small probability 
of contamination «as realized. Sterility is an absolute state, extremely 
difficult to achieve «hen considering large and complex equipment, and 
almost impossible to guarantee. Thus, the idea of planetary quarantine 
replaced that of complete sterilization. In a joint paper published in 
1959, R. W. Davies and M. G. Comuntzis [3] recommended, among other goals, 
that the probability of landing a viable terrestrial organism on Mars 
and Venus should be kept belo« one chance in a million per mission during 
the early phases of exploration of these planets. This number «as rather 
arbitrary, and «as later revised. 
2.2.2 Planetary Quarantine Research 
These early directives and recommendations fostered a major effort 
in spacecraft sterilization and biological research. At that time, there 
«as little experience pertinent to the ne« problems that had to be solved. 
For example, it «as soon recognized that viable microorganisms could be 
trapped «ithin closed cavities, bet,~en mated surfaces, or even encap-
sulated into solid materials such as plastics. These organisms could 
be released upon impact o£ a spacecraft on a planet and during the mate-
rial's subsequent fracture and erosion. Classical sterili.zation tech-
niques such as «ashing «ith sporicidal agents could only sterilize ex-
posed surfaces; they «ere inefficient against trapped organisms. Ne« 
techniques of decontamination had to be developed using penetrating agents 
such as dry heat and radiation. 
Efforts «ere also made to reduce the probability of accidental 
impact by improving the accuracy and reliability of guidance and propul-
sion systems. Ne« strategies biasing spacecraft trajectories a«ay from 
the target planet «ere introduced to prevent an impact following a rocket 
or spacecraft malfunction. 
At the same time, ne« kno«ledge in biology and planetology per~ 
mitted more accurate assessments of the probability that terrestrial 
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microorganisms, if released on a given planet in a viable state, would 
gro~, and multiply. 
2.2.3 Present International Quarantine Policy 
Through all these developments, the same basic formulation of 
planetary quarantine p'olicy has been retained. The international agree-
ment reached at the meeting of the Committee of Space Research of the 
International Council of Scientific Unions (COSPAR) in 1966 has not since 
been fundamentally modified. The formulation follows the inspiration of 
the earlier recommendation by Davies and Comuntzis [3] and is illustrated 
by a statement from NASA Policy Directive 8020-10, dated September 6, 1967: 
Biological Contamination: the basic probability of one in 
one thousand (1 X 10-3 ) that a planet of biological interest 
will be contaminated shall be used as the guiding criterion 
during the period of biological exploration of Mars, Venus, 
Mercury, Jupiter, and other planets and their satellites 
that are deemed important for the exploration of life, life 
precursors and remnants thereof. 
The two major features of this policy are that: 
(1) A limit to contamination is expressed in terms of a 
maximum probability that certain celestial bodies 
will be contaminated during a given period. 
(2) The maximum probability of contamination to be shared 
by all space-faring nations is expressed by a number 
internationally agreed upon. 
cal 
At the international level, this may be the most useful and practi-
formulation of planetary quarantine to date. However, a careful ex-
amination of the needs for a planetary quarantine policy reveals three 
sources of difficulties with the current formulation: 
(1) Although the maximum probability of contamination 
indicated in the policy can be revised by a new 
international agreement, there is no guideline to 
relate this probability to the basic benefits, costs, 
and contamination consequences that may result from 
space exploration. 
15 
- -,,- ,';-
. i 
1 
4 
(2) Using probability constraints may violate the basic 
axioms for rational decision making under uncertainty 
as they are stated in modern economic and statistical 
theory (see discussion in the appendix). 
(3) It is impossible to formulate the determination of 
a planetary exploration strategy as a unique sequential 
decision problem (see explanation in Section 2.4.2). 
In addition, because the present policy fails to define "biological 
interest," "period of biological exploration," "important for the explora-
tion of life," and "contaminated," ambiguities hamper the already com-
plicated task of implementing it. 
2.2.4 Implementation of International Policy in U.S. Program 
Planning by the Planetary Quarantine Office of NASA 
A Planetary Quarantine Office, attached to the Planetary Programs 
Office, Office of Space Science and Applications, NASA, was created in 
1963 to carry out the U.S. planetary quarantine program under the super-
vision of the Space Science Board. NASA directive NHB 8020-12, "Plane-
tary Quarantine Provisions for Unmanned Planetary Missions," April 1969, 
specifies that mission plans must be submitted to the Planetary Quaran-
tine Officer (PQO) for approval. The details of the procedures for sub-
mission and approval of plans are being revised to take into 
degree of biological interest of each contemplated mission. 
account the 
The basic 
functions of the PQO, however, are clear, and can be grouped into three 
tasks: 
(1) Promote and coordinate planetary quarantine research. 
(2) Provide standards, methodologies, and other necessary 
supports for assessing probabilities of contamination. 
(3) Set criterion for approval of mission plans. 
The purposes of tasks land 2 are easily understood. Task 3 is 
more interesting to describe here because it parallels, at a higher 
level in the space exploration decision hierarchy, the task of the mis-
sion planner. 
The problem of selecting the optimal space exploration program for 
biological exploration of the solar planets and satellites is too formi-
dable to be_tackled as a whole. Decomposition methods must be used to 
reduce the problem to a series of simpler subproblems. At the same time, 
a system of coordination signals must be devised to insure that the 
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optimization of each subproblem will lead to the optimum for the entire 
program. Thus the analysis of a space exploration program can be de-
composed into analyses of mission projects, which in turn can be decom-
posed into analyses of guidance and control decisions. 
2.2.5 NASA's Probability Allocation Process: The Pie Analogy 
The decomposition and coordination mechanism used by NASA is to 
allocate maximum probabilities of contamination to each component of a 
space exploration program. The PQO sets a maximum probability of con-
tamination to each mission project, the mission allocation; project 
planners further divide this allocation among the various guidance and 
control decisions as probability suballocations. The mechanism is 
complicated by the dynamic aspect of the problem: outcomes become known 
as decisions are made. 
It is tempting to describe this allocation process using a pie to 
represent the total probability of contamination available to the PQO for 
all U.S. missions. A mission manager submits his plans to the PQO and 
asks for a piece of the pie for his mission. Based on the missio~ de-
scription and the estimated total number and types of missions that wii! 
be flown during the period of biological interest, the PQO decides how 
large a piece of pie (mission allocation) the mission manager should 
receive. Following the flight, the mission manager must report how much 
of his piece he has actually consumed. Any amount left over from the 
mission allocation will be returned to the PQO to be shared by other 
missions. 
The same analogy could be used for the mission planner trying to 
design his mission by first subdividing his piece of pie among numerous 
decisions. 
There are many issues involved in partitioning the probability 
pie; for example: 
• 
• 
• 
What is a mission's fair share of the pie? 
How can we know what has been left over? 
What happens if the mission eats the whole pie, 
perhaps a thousand times over? 
• What provisions should be made for unexpected guests? 
The analogy of the pie, although definitely an oversimplification, 
mcy at first seem appropriate, when, in reality it is dangerous and 
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confusing. The concept of probability is simple, but subtle--more so 
than pie. 
2.3 Probability in the Context of Quarantine Planning 
2.3.1 The Concept of Probability 
A probability is a number expressing a state of knowledge about 
the occurrence of an uncertain event; it does not represent a physical 
entity, like a weight or volume. Thus, two individuals who do not share 
the same information will generally assess two different probabilities to 
the occurrence of the same event. 
For example, assume that experts reach a consensus On a definition 
of life. We shall say L represents that planet Mars bears this kind of 
life today. Assessments of the probability of L would certainly vary 
widely among experts because it is practically impossible for two experts 
to share exactly the same information about Martian life. Note, however, 
that the subjective aspect cf the probability concept does not prevent 
decisions being based on probability judgments. Indeed, the possible 
existence of Martian life is being investigated, and the resources spent 
to that end can only be justified by subjective probabilities of obtain-
ing certain answers. 
2.3.2 Probability Updating: Bayes' Rule 
This example leads us to a second consequence of the subjective 
character of the probability concept: A probability assessment must be 
revised when new information becomes available. The qualifications 
"prior" and "posterior" are used to distinguish the probabilities of the 
same event before and after receiving new information. By. their very 
nature, probabilities are subject to the rules of logic, which guarantee 
a consistency between probabilities reflecting different states of in-
formation. The revision of a prior probability to a posterior probability 
must obey a precise logical rule known as Bayes' Rule. 
To illustrate this rule, suppose a life detection eXperiment is 
carried out on Mars and does not reveal the presence of life (as defined 
by L). We shall call N this negative result. The negative result does 
not necessarily mean that life does not exist: the experimental result 
is highly localized and may be subject to distortions. What then, is 
the posterior probability of life (L) given the negative result (N)? 
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If ~qe denote by peL) the prior probability of an L and by peL! N) 
the posterior probability of L given the occurrence of N, Bayes' Rule. 
indicates that 
p(L!N) = peL) X peN! L) peN) * (2-1) 
In ~qords, the posterior probability of life given the negative 
experimental result must be equal to the prior probability of life 
multiplied by the resolution of the life detector as expressed by the 
likelihood ratio p(N!L)/p(N). In general the denominator of this ratio 
cannot be assessed directly but can be further decomposed into. the proba-
bility of a negative ~esult given either that life exists (L) or that 
life does not exist (L). Mathematically: 
peN) = p(NIL) peL) + p(NIL) peL) 
As an illustration, if 
peL) = 0.01 
p(N!L) = 0.2 
p(NIL) = 0.999 
and therefore peL) = 1 - peL) = 0.99 
we obtain 
I 
p(N!L) 
peL N) = peL) X p(NIL) peL) + p(NIL) peL) 
0.2 
= 0.01 X 0.01 X 0.01 + 0.999 X 0.99 
p(LIN) = 0.01 X 0.2 = 0.002. 
(2-2) 
Bayes' Rule is a straightforward extension of the definition of condi-
tional probability. Consider the jOint event N,L: 
P(N,L) = p(LIN)P(N) 
= p(NIL)P(L) 
If peN) '" 0, we can divide by it, givingEq. (2-1). Bayes' Rule is 
nothing more than- a consistency requirement on probability assessments 
reflecting different states of information. 
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The posterior probability of life given the negative result is about 
five times smaller than the prior probability of life. 
2.3.3 The Prior Interpretation of a Probability Allocation 
A probability allocation (or probability constraint), as defined 
in current procedures, should not be confused with the probability of 
an event: A probability allocation is a constraint arbitrarily imposed 
on a decision or a sequence of decisions. As such, it is not subject 
to any specific revision rule, and is only re1uired to have a clear 
meaning. In particular, we must be able to verify whether or not a 
decision or a sequence of decisions exceeds a probability allocation. 
The meaning of a probability constraint is simple when applied to 
a single decision: Based on the state of knowledge prevailing at the 
time the decision is made, the probability that the decision will lead 
to contamination should be less than the constraint value. 
It is mOre difficult to verify that a sequence of decisions does 
not violate a probability constraint. To describe a sequence of deci-
sions, we need to use the concept of a strategy. A strategy is a com-
plete specification as to the decision to be made at each stage in the 
sequence; for later stages the decision may be contingent on outcomes 
of (or information obtained after) earlier decisions. Hence, the first 
decision in the sequence may be consistent with many alternative strate-
gies that differ in the choices to be made at subsequent stages. 
The probability that a sequence of decisions will cause contamina-
tion is assessed initially with the state of information prevailing at 
the time the first decision must be made. This decision must take into 
account the choice among strategies available for subsequent decisions. 
It requires a model of the sequence of decisions and prob~bilistic conse-
quences and a rule specifying which alternative will be taken at each 
subsequent decision stage. 
If the probability of contamination associated with the initial 
decision does not exceed the probability constraint, and if the inten-
tion is to follow the strategy as set forth in the prior analysis, it 
can be said that the probability constraint has been satisfied. We shall 
refer to this interpretation that the constraint has been satisfied as 
the prior interpretat.ion principle. We believe it is the only consistent 
rule under which a probability constraint is meaningful in a sequence of 
decisions made under uncertainty. 
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The initial strategy may, however, be abandoned for a new strategy 
during the execution of the decision sequence. A new strategy may be-
come available, or new information not included in the prior analysis 
may modify the state of knowledge about future events in an unforeseen 
way. The planning process cannot verify that the probability constraint 
will not be exceeded in future states of information that may arise. Good 
planning cannot guarantee good outcomes in all cases. 
2.3.4 Illustration: Arbitrariness of Probability Suballocations 
A simple example, shown in Figure 2.1, will illustrate the prior 
interpretation principle. A mission calls for the exploration of a planet 
by probes. The mission planner proposes the following strategy: Send a 
first probe with a probability of contamination of 5 X 10-5 and a proba-
bility of satisfactory results of 0.5. Stop if the first probe provides 
the desired results; otherwise, send a second probe with a larger proba-
bility of obtaining results and a probability of contamination of 10-4 • 
The prior probability of contamination for the entire mission is 
-5 -4 5 X 10 + 0.5 X 10 
When a sequence of decisions is subject to a probability constraint, 
there is generally an infinity of possible probability suballocations for 
each decision. Figure 2.1 illustrates this point. In it, Q denotes the 
mission allocation for the two probes; ql' the probability suballocation 
for the first probe; and q2 and q3' the probability suballocations for 
the second probe knowing that the first has been successful (probability 
p) or unsuccessful (probability 1 - p), respectively. The mission allo-
cation imposes a single constraint on the three suballocations, namely, 
(2-3) 
There is therefore a wide choice of probability suballocations 
ql' q2' and q3' To each set of suballocations will correspond a choice 
of probes and a resulting expected scientific value for the mission. 
Unfortunately, the planetary quarantine requirement (mission allocation) 
offers no general rule indicating which assignment of probability sub-
allocations will lead to the most valuable mission. Likewise, at a higher 
level, there is no indication about which choice of mission allocations 
will lead to the most valuable space exploration program. 
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FIGURE 2.1 
PRIOR INTERPRETATION: A TWO-PROBE MISSION 
MISSION ALLOCATION 0. = 1 x 10-4 
Success 
(p = 0.5) No Second Probe [q2 = 0) 
LAUNCH 
FIRST 
PROBE 
Failure 
(l-p = o.~ Launch Second Probe [q3 = 1x10-4) 
D = Decision node; 0 = Chance node; () = Probability; 
[ ) = Probability of contamination 
NOTE: The prior probability of contamination is: 5 x 10-5 + 0.5 x 1 x 10-4 = 1 x 10-4 
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2.3.5 Revision of Probabilities: Reallocation is Wrong 
How can we allocate, revise, and reallocate probabilities of 
contamination? The answers to these questions depend on the interpre-
tation given to the maximum probability of contamination inscribed in 
NASA's planetary quarantine policy. 
That the probability of contamination 
even during a mission flight is evident from 
bility as representing a state of knowledge. 
can be revised after and 
the definition of a proba-
If a mission flight is 
monitored and information is gained on its results, the posterior proba-
bility that the mission has caused contamination will generally differ 
from the prior probability. To be sure, mission controllers will often 
know with certainty whether the spacecraft has or has not impacted the 
target planet, thus reducing considerably the uncertainty of the con-
tamination event. For example, the probability that contamination of 
Mars resulted from Mariners 3, 4, 6, 7, and 8 has been revised toward 
zero because indications are that none of these spacecraft touched Mars 
or its atmosphere. 
Can the original mission allocations for these Mariner flights be 
declared "unused" and reallocated to new missions? The proponents of 
such a reallocation should first recognize that it will not necessarily 
result in less restrictive planetary. quarantine constraints. For if 
reallocation is valid when a probability allocation has not been "used," 
it should also be valid when a probability allocation has been exceeded. 
Imagine that one of the early Mariner fly-bys of Mars had crashed 
On the red planet and that the revised probability of contamination were 
larger than 1 x 10-3 • Would the proponents of reallocation admit to 
having "used" mOre than their allocation and therefore violated the inter-
national planetary quarantine agreement? Or will they hold that they 
had made their decision in good faith and can therefore launch further 
missions to Mars? The first interpretation seems absurd: How would the 
PQO be held responsible for excessive posterior probabilities? Doubtless, 
it would not be the first instance of somebody being judged for bad out-
comes rather than bad decisions but this practice should certainly not 
be encouraged. 
If retained, this interpretation would only leave two options to 
the PQO: 
(1) Reject all missions having the slightest chance of 
contamination. 
(2) Ignore the previous missions results. 
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The first option is a return to the inoperational absolute sterilization 
standard; the second option requires some explanations. 
A reallocation process could conceivably place negative incentives 
on gathering information on mission results every time a chance existed 
that the probability of contamination had exceeded the mission alloca-
tion. Knowing such information, the mission manager would have to make 
a costly corrective maneuver, if possible, or the PQO would have to im-
pose more severe constraints on subsequent missions. (See the appendix 
for more details). 
Reallocation based on posterior probabilities is also clearly 
inconsistent with the prior interpretation of planetary quarantine. To 
illustrate this point, imagine Someone willing to play forever at Russian 
roulette with a six-chamber revolver and a single bullet. Although this 
individual faces one chance in six of being killed every time he plays, 
his posterior probability of being killed if the gun doesn't fire is 
always null. Most onlookers will agree, however, that in the long run 
the probability that he will shoot himself is 1 and not 1/6 as the pro-
ponents of reallocation based on posterior probabilities would have us 
believe. With or without the prior interpretation of planetary quaran-
tine, the idea of a reallocation process based on posterior probabilities 
must therefore be rejected. 
2.3.6 Illustration With a Single-Decision Fly-By Mission 
. ........ 1._. 
The example illustrated in Figure 2.2 will help our understanding 
of reallocations based on posterior probabilities. The mission is a 
single-decision fly-by mission, which upon launching has a 6 X 10-5 proba-
bility of ending on an impact trajectory. The probability of contamina-
tion on impact is assumed to be 1. The prior probability of contamination 
associated with the mission is therefore simply 6 X 10-5 • If the mission 
allocation is larger than 6 x 10-5, say 10-4, the mission can be launched. 
Proponents of reallocation based on posterior probabilities claim that 
if the mission has not resulted in an impact, the revised probability 
of contamination is zero and the unused mission allocation can be real-
located to other missions. Thus, it is likely that, say, 20 such fly-bys 
could be sent without causing contamination. In fact, the probability 
that such a program will not cause contamination is exactly the product 
of the probabilities that each mission will not cause contamination, 
that is, 
20 
(1 - 6 X 10-5) ~ 1 - 1.2 X 10-3 
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FIGURE 2.2 
A SINGLE-DECISION FLy,.BY MISSION 
Yes [6 x 10-5] 
* 
Yes 
IMPACT 
LAUNCH 
No {1 - 6 x 10-5] 
No 
o = Decision node; 0 = Chance node; * = Contamination; 
. [ ] =, Probability of contamination 
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In other words, the strategy consisting of sending a series of up to 
20 similar fly-bys as long as none has caused contamination will cause 
contamination with a probability of nearly 1.2 x 10-3 • Proponents of 
reallocations cannot share th2 prior interpretation of the planetary 
quarantine policy; the ttvO views are incompatible. 
2.3.7 Posterior Probabilities and Planetary Quarantine Policy 
It is felt intuitively that knowing whether or not a planet has 
been contaminated (posterior probability) should influence the planetary 
quarantine requirements imposed on future missions. Because posterior 
probabilities cannot be used for making reallocations, what then should 
be the effect of posterior probabilities on planetary quarantine require-
ments? 
The answer lies in an extension of the international agreements to 
cover multiple contaminations of a planet. As long as the probability 
of a contamination is very small, the probabilities of multiple contam-
inations are negligible. However, should a posterior probability of 
contamination be close to 1, chances are that the next contamination 
event will be the second one. A second contamination may have different 
consequences from a first. So far, concerns over multiple contaminations 
have not been expressed in planetary quarantine policies. 
2.3.8 Suggestions by Previous Authors 
J. O. Light [4] was among the first to recognize the shortcomings 
of the "nominal plan - preset suballocations" analysis. The prior inter-
pretation of planetary quarantine reqhirements does not impose such an 
analytical procedure. To quote from Light: 
The entire formulation of the non-contamination constraint 
is nonsense unless we devise the strategy for making in-
flight decisions before the flight, correctly incorporate 
this strategy into our probability model, and then adhere 
to this strategy. A beneficial by-product of this formu-
lation of the non-contamination policy will be the necessity 
to carefully consider all the standard and non-standard con-
ditions which we might encounter •••• 
Light makes two additional points: (1) planetary quarantine re-
quirements are insufficient to select a unique mission strategy, and 
(2) some feasible strategies are preferable to others. 
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Considerations other than strictly planetary quarantine constraints 
should be introduced into mission planning to determine the optimal 
strategy among all feasible strategies. Thus, the scientific value of 
a mission should play an important role. Everything else being equal, 
a strategy with a large expected scientific value and a low prior proba-
bility of contamination is desirable. However, a smaller scientific 
value must often be traded for a lower probability of contamination; 
hence, the desirability of assessing a trade-off value. 
Of course, one might also go as far as to propose not only supple-
mental objectives but also additional constraints to remedy the laxity 
of prior interpretation, which would eliminate heretofore feasible strate-
gies. 
Thus, under prior interpretation, there may be acceptable strate-
gies involving conditional probabilities of contamination far exceeding 
the mission allocation. If the mission allocation i.s interpreted as 
representing a trade-off between expected scientific return and risk of 
contamination, how can these higher conditional probabilities be justified? 
An example may illustrate the importance of the probability that 
a contingent event will occur. Suppose that a guidance decision, if 
taken, gives a spacecraft a probability of 10-6 that both its propulsion 
system will fail and it will be on an impact trajectory. Since this 
probability is below the mission allocation of 10-4 , the decision is 
taken; subsequently it is learned that the spacecraft is on an impact 
trajectory and the propulsion system has failed. Clearly this would be 
a bad outcome, but would it be the result of a bad decision? If the 
probability assessment of 10-6 is a reasonable reflection of the informa-
tion available at the time the guidance decision was made, we would say 
the decision was good. The conditional probability of contamination given 
an impact trajectory and rocket failure was approximately equal to 1, but 
the probability that the condition would occur was so small that the con-
straint was met. 
Some authors, such as Light and Chamberlain, have been more con-
cerned about the rigidity of the probability suballocation process. 
R. G. Chamberlain [5] has proposed a method intended to free mission 
planners from problems associated with probability reallocations. Chamber-
lain's method is based on an identification of states of nature and a deci-
sion criterion that does not take into account the probabilities of these 
states. Our understanding of his method is as follows: 
• Suppose that a mission consists of m stages at which we 
will need or have the opportunity to execute a guidance 
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decision. Since each decision may be either executed or 
not, there are at most 2m subsets of possible executions.* 
At the planning stage, we are uncertain about which of 
these subsets we will obtain; each subset ,qill have an 
associated probability. 
• Following Chamberlain's proposed procedure, ,qe make the 
guidance decisions so that the mission allocation will 
not be exceeded for any execution subset, regardless 
of its probability. 
Chamberlain's proposed procedure was intended to be used only 
within certain bounds, for in some cases it would be much more restrictive 
than the prior interpretation principle. An example will illustrate this 
problem. Consider the last two maneuvers of a fly-by mission. Follow-
ing the first maneuver the propulsion system will fail with probability p. 
If the propulsion system does not fail, we aSSume the second maneuver 
is executable. We denote by ql and q2 the probabilities of putting the 
spacecraft on an impact trajectory as a result of each of the two maneuvers. 
The probability of contamination given impact is approximately 1. The 
probability allocation for this sequence of 2 maneuvers is denoted by Q. 
According to Chamberlain's proposed procedure the probability 
allocation must not be exceeded whether or not the propulsion system 
fails. Hence the two constraints 
These two constraints are always more restrictive than the single con-
straint that the prior probability of contamination for the two maneuvers 
be less than the probability allocation, that is, 
Typical numerical values might be Q = 2 X 10-5 and p = 10-4 and therefore 
the constraint imposed by Chamberlain's procedure on the first maneuver 
* It may be known in advance that some combination of guidance decisions 
are unfeasible. 
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(ql < 2 x 10-5) might force to bias the spacecraft trajectory away from 
the target planet in a manner that is not imposed by the prior interpre-
tation principle (e.g., ql = 0.1 and q2 = 10-5 is feasible). 
Chamberlain's method should therefore not be used lvithout care. 
Chamberlain believes that for the majority of the planning problems en-
countered in the past, his procedure, if carefully applied, was capable 
of bringing some simplifications without unduly overconstraining the 
missions. We believe that the main advantage of Chamberlain's method 
is to force explicit consideration of contingent states of nature. How-
ever, any planning simplification brought about by this method is ob-
tained at the expense of adding new constraints and ignoring potentially 
important information about the probability of occurrence of each state 
of nature. This may become inappropriate for the planning of more complex 
missions such as multiple-encounter missions. 
2.3.9 Probabilities in the Context of Quarantine 
Planning: A Summary 
Concern over planetary contamination has resulted in the assign-
ment of probability constraints for mission planning. The intentions 
behind the policy are admirable, but the procedures for implementing the 
policy need revision. 
Probabilities are the reflection of states of knowledge that may 
evolve in time; it is a subtle task to keep them within limits. To give 
an operational meaning to a probability constraint, one must specify the 
probabilistic event to which it applies and the state of knowledge used 
as a basis for assessing the probability of that event. 
When a single decision or a sequential decision is subject to a 
maximum probability of contamination constraint, it is clear that the 
constraint can be applied only to a prior probability of contamination, 
as it may be assessed when the mission strategy is planned. To state 
the contrary, i.e., to judge a decision on its outcome, would be inopera-
tional, and policies of this type lead to contradiction from given ob-
jectives. 
We have stated a prior interpretation principle that defines pre-
cisely how the probability of contamination of a decision sequence can 
be assessed. This prior interpretation is widely accepted, although 
not always defined precisely nor applied systematically. 
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2.4 The Elements of Rational Quarantine Planning 
2.4.1 Explicit Goals and Planning Horizon 
Exploration of the planets has become an ongoing business rather 
than a dramatic new scientific capability. Ideally, the planning of 
exploration efforts should be carried out through a formal process that 
makes goals explicit and allows a particular mission to be seen in the 
context of a comprehensive program. The desirability of such planning 
was clearly evident to those who first proposed a quarantine policy [6]. 
Yet the annual nature of Congressional appropriations and the large role 
of scientific advisory groups in NASA has led away from a formal process 
for long-range planning. This reality complicates the job of the mission 
planner because he does not receive clear direction on goals and objec-
tives. The problem is compounded by the effect of his present mission 
On future exploration efforts, which may be important yet difficult to 
define. 
A major difficulty is that there is no established timetable for 
when certain types of missions may be attempted, even where the feasibility 
of such missions may be easily assessed. Attractive five-year programs 
may be potentially undesirable if considered as the first five years of 
a 20-year program. Conversely, the first five years of an optimal 20-
year program may seem to provide little scientific information at a high 
cost because they prepare the way for the next 15 years. Selecting a 
distant planning horizon is usually preferable to selecting a close one; 
it provides a less restrictive framework for planning space exploration 
programs. 
A second difficulty is to identify the possible outcomes of space 
exploration programs and to assign values to them. Unfortunately, the 
difficulty increases with the span of the planning horizon. Assigning 
values to well-defined, short-term research efforts is already an arduous 
task. The economic value of scientific information is not directly mea-
surable; its assessment requires consideration of all potential decisions 
that might benefit from the new knowledge. An additional complexity of 
long term research efforts is that early findings will raise new questions 
whose answers might be deemed important enough to redirect the research. 
2.4.2 Formal CriterIa for Selecting Among Space Exploration Programs 
To summarize; translating concerns over possible contamination 
into a specific criterion for accepting or rejecting planetary explora-
tion programs requires: 
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(1) The specification of a planning horizon. 
(2) The identification of outcomes over the planning hori-
zon and the assessment of values, at least on a relative 
scale, to these outcomes (e.g., contamination penalty 
relative to scientific value). 
A space exploration program may then be represented as a sequeooe ~ 
of decisions and probabilistic outcomes.
A Outcomes comprise the Succes-
sive states of the system (achievements in the exploration program) and 
information affecting the state of knowledge about the spacecraft and 
its dynamics and about celestial objects of interest. The selection of 
an optimal program then becomes a well-defined dynamic optimization 
problem, amenable to solution by standard methods such as dynamic pro-
grannning. 
Interestingly, solutions of dynamic problems share a fundamental 
property: The optimal course of action at a given time depends only on 
the state of knowledge about the state of the system and its dynamics 
at that time; it does not depend on how this state of knowledge was 
reached. Thus the present probabilities that a planet has been contam-
inated or will be contaminated are factors pertinent to the planning of 
new missions. Prior probabilities of contamination are only importan
t 
as they aff"ct the current state of knowledge, Le., the current proba-
bility that a planet has been contaminated or will be contaminated. 
Probability allocation procedures currently in use do not share this 
property. 
Dynamic progrannning provides powerful concepts and a logic for 
solving certain types of sequential decision problems, i.e., problems 
in which ~ sequence of decisions must be made with each decision affect-
ing future decisions. The basic principle of dynamic progrannning is 
that in an optimal strategy for n sequential deciSions, the last (n - 1) 
decisions also form an optimal strategy. An optimal strategy might 
therefore be constructed in a recursive manner if we start by determining 
the optimal strategy for the last decision. 
To that end, state variables, i.e., variables whose values com-
pletely specify the instantaneous situations of the sequential decision 
problem at any stage, must be defined. The maximum permissible proba-
bility of contamination is part of the spe~ifications of space explora-
tion decisions and should therefore be included among the state variables
. 
* For an example of this formulation, see Matheson and Roths' paper [7] 
and a report on the Voyager project by SRI [8]. 
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However, at any decision stage except perhaps the first one, there 
is no unique assignment of probability constraints on the remaining 
decision. Instead, there is an infinite number of assignments satisfying 
the probability constraint imposed upon the complete sequence of decisions
 
(recall Section 2.3.4 and Figure 2.1). Therefore, not one but an infinite 
number of dynamic programming problems exist and there is no general rule 
to indicate which choice of probability constraints leads to the most 
valuable solution. 
In Section 3 we propose a new methodology that assesses values 
to all the outcomes of a mission or a space exploration program. An 
optimal strategy can then be determined by dynamic programming. This 
new methodology can be applied with limits imposed upon strategies by 
probability constraints, but it does not require such limits. 
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3 A NEW METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Design Principles for a New Methodology 
3.1.1 The Rationale for a New Methodology 
Current and contemplated planetary exploration missions are raising 
intricate new planning problems. Early planetary missions consisted of 
fly-bys with little flexibility in the choice of trajectories, limited 
scientific payloads, and often relatively short and well-defined useful 
lives. Nominal plans were devised for these missions and closely fol-
lowed in the absence of unexpected catastrophic failures. 
Orbiters, landers, and now multiple-encounter missions require 
more than a nominal plan. The number of guidance maneuvers has increased. 
SCientific payloads have become more sophisticated, and many experiments 
are competing for the choice of trajectories and the use of common re-
sources such as energy. Planning horizons must be extended to several 
years for the expl.oration of outer planets and sometimes become difficult 
to define. At the same time, a greater number of failure modes and execu-
tion errors of val),L"g severity can be expected. Under these circum-
stances, strict adherence to a nominal mission plan may be less than 
optimal, if not impossible. It is preferable to develop contingency 
plans, that is, to analyze foreseeable circumstances and determine the 
best course of action in each specific case. 
The need to consider contingent events and decisions is particularly 
apparent in the assessment of contamination probabilities. A simple con-
tamination analysis of a nominal mission plan is sufficient, provided 
that the nominal plan be followed and that no new information pertinent 
to the risk of contamination be gained during the mission flight. These 
conditions fed to the development of standard expressions of planetary 
quarantine requirements and standard contamination analysis procedures. 
But advanced missions do not meet these conditions; we must now analyze 
contingency plans that take into account not only failure modes and exe-
cution errors but also information about the region of space being ex-
plored. For example, the discovery of high radiation belts surrounding 
a planet can affect both the bioload and the reliability of a spacecraft 
traversing them. The probability of the spacecraft impacting the planet 
and the probability of contamination given impact must be revised ac-
cordingly. 
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For these advanced missions, the planetary quarantine policy in 
its current formulation is difficult to implement both conceptually and 
practically. Conceptually, the meaning of a probability constraint 
imposed on a sequence of decisions is subtle. A detailed analysis of 
the various states of knowledge and strategies intended at the time each 
decision is executed must be carried out. Practically, the assignment 
of a probability constraint may be inconsistent ~~ith the logic of se-
quential decision making. 
We believe that, with the experience of current procedures, it 
is now time to develop a new approach to planetary quarantine on sound 
bases. Although many interpretations of the planetary quarantine policy 
can be made, none of these can eradicate the fundamental difficulties 
inherent in the chance-constrained formulation. These difficulties 
will become increasingly 
templated for the 1980s. 
apparent in planning the complex missions con-
A fresh approach is therefore required. 
The current policy, however, cannot be modified completely and 
instantaneously. It has permitted, so far, remarkable scientific achieve-
ments and very lOl~ probabilities of contamination. A revision of the u.s. 
planetary quarantine program and ultimately of the COSPAR agreement will 
require extensive debate among all interested parties and preferably some 
trial cases of the proposed revisions. 
A ne,~ approach must therefore be general enough to supersede ulti-
mately the current chance-constrained formulation and, in the meantime, 
be compatible with it. That is, a new methodology should permit deter-
mining a feasible and rational strategy for a project now subject to a 
maximum permissible probability of contamination. 
3.1.2 A Rational Allocation of Resources Through Explicit Trade-Offs 
There are many ways to reduce the probability that a missi~n will 
lead to contamination. For example, wr can reduce the bioload of the 
spacecraft, reduce the probability of an accidental impact by biasing 
the trajectory away from the capture circle of the target planet, improve 
the reliability of the propulsion and guidance systems, and so forth. 
All these actions tend to increase co'.:ts and time delays or reduce flexi-
bility and expected scientific returns, i.e., they correspond to the 
use of resources measured on a mission value scale. On the other hand, 
the reduction in contamination probability may have a direct scientific 
value (e.g., minimizing the probability of a false result in a life 
detection experiment) or, more often, an indirect value for subsequent 
missions. 
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The first problem faced in mission planning is therefore to de-
velop a strategy that ,"ill achieve a given reduction in contamination 
probability at a minimum cost, i.e., for a minimum reduction of the 
expected value of a mission exclusive of contamination considerations. 
A solution to this problem requires that the costs and scientific 
values associated with alternative strategies be measured on a common 
scale, a difficult but inescapable task. A solution technique must rely 
on trade-offs lvell-defined in simple situations if it is to help balance 
the use of resources in complex situations. At the guidance decision 
level, a relative scale may be sufficient; the use of each resource may 
be expressed as a fraction of the expected scientific value of a nominal 
flight. At the mission design level, a dollar scale may be preferable 
because direct costs playa paramount role in the choice among mission 
design alternatives. 
As the probability of contamination of a mission is decreased, 
each incremental reduction becomes more difficult (costly) to achieve. 
The second problem faced in mission planning is therefore to determine 
at what point a marginal reduction in the probability of contamination 
lvould entai 1 an 
mission value). 
unacceptable increase in mission cost (or reduction in 
Determining this break-even point requires that the 
dangers of contamination be measured on the same scale as the resources 
used to avoid contamination. 
3.1.3 Illustration of the Trade-Off Between Expected Scientific 
Value and Probability of Contamination 
\ole can illustrate the relationship between the use of a contamina-
tion value and a probability constraint by the representation of mission 
strategies given in Figure 3.1. Each strategy is characterized by two 
numbers, a probability of contamination (on the horizontal axis) and the 
expected value of scientific achievement and other exploration objectives, 
excluding quarantine (on the vertical axis). \ole consider all possible 
mission strategies, and we identify the set of strategies so that for 
each of them, no other strategy lies above or to the left; that is, for 
the same probability of contamination, no other strategy has a higher 
expected value of scientific and other objectives, and for the same ex-
pected value of scientific and other objectives, no other strategy has 
a lower probability of contamination. This set of strategies is lvidely 
known in the economic theory that deals with trade-offs among different 
objectives, and follo,"ing the I'ractice in economics, we shall refer to 
it as the Pareto-optimal border. 
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FIGURE 3.1 
REPRESENTATION OF MISSION STRATEGIES: 
EXPECTED VALUE VERSUS PROBABILITY OF CONTAMINATION 
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In choosing among strategies for the mission, He Hill Hant cer-
tainly to choose one on the Pareto-optimal border; for any strategy 
that does not belong to this set, one can find a strategy on the border 
with either a 10Her probability of contamination or a higher expected 
. * value by movLng up and to the left. 
Which one do l~e choose? Our choice involves a trade-off between 
increments of expected value on the vertical axis and increments in the 
probability of contamination on the horizontal axis; the ratio of these 
increments is the slope of the tangent line to the Pareto-optimal border. 
In turn, this slope at a point On the Pareto-optimal border defines a 
contamination penalty if it is assumed that the values of the increments 
balance each other. By dividing the increment in expected value by the 
increment in contamination probability, He obtain a loss per unit of con-
tamination probability; if this unit is made equal to one, it is the 
penalty associated with contamination. The increasing slopes from right 
to left on the Pareto-optimal border correspond to increasing contamina-
tion penalties; a given marginal decrease in contamination probability 
corresponds to larger and larger marginal decreases in expected value. 
3.1.4 The Relation Between Value Trade-Off and Probability Constraint 
An assessment of a contamination penalty is implicit in the cur-
rent procedures. If the equivalent of $10 million is spent in steriliza-
tion costs--including costs ascribed to any resulting time delays and 
reduction in reliability--to decrease the probability of contamination 
of a given mission, say from 1 X 10-4 to 5 X 10-5, then the implicit pen-
alty associated with contamination is 
K = 10/(5 X 10-5) = 2 X 105 million = $200 billion 
More generally, if a contamination penalty is not available for planning 
but a probability constraint is available and a set of possible strategies 
is given, then a penalty can be infe:red from the constraint. 
* Practically, the assessment of an expected scientific value and a proba-
bility of contamination for each strategy is always proximal, and strate-
gies close to the optimal border should not be neglected. Rather, a 
more detailed assessment of strategies on or close to the optimal border 
may be justified before a final decision is made. 
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Suppose an allocation Q is given as the maximum permissible proba-
bility of contamination. Then the strategy space of Figure 3.1 is divided 
into "acceptlt and "reject" regions as shown in Figure 3.2. The mission 
planner then ,.ishes to select the highest expected value in the "accept" 
region as the preferred strategy. This strategy has the highest value 
consistent with the probability constraint. The slope of the Pareto-
optimal border at the selected strategy indicates the contamination 
penalty implied by the mission allocation. 
An explicit assessment of the contamination penalty would be pref-
erable. When only one space exploration project is considered and has 
a well-defitled design (fixed set of physically possible strategies), the 
assessment of a probability allocation implies a contamination penalty. 
If, however, an uncertain number of projects is contemplated over an 
ill-defined time horizon, the assignment of coherent probability alloca-
tions (coherent in the sense that the use of resources will be well 
balanced) is practically impossible. On the other hand, the assessment 
of a contamination penalty should not be influenced by the number and 
type of missions planned during a given period. It should depend only 
on knowledge about the target planet and may be revised upwards or down-
wards as planetary exploration progresses and new information is gained. 
For example, it may be that at some point contamination may become 
desirable as we attempt to create or modify a planet's biota. 
The assessment of the value of contamination penalty is particu-
larly challenging. To start with, contamination must be defined. Con-
tamination might be a catastrophic, or irrelevant, outcome, or even an 
interesting development, depending on the planet being contaminated, the 
extent and nature of the contamination, and its timing in the explora-
tion program. the assessment of the value of contamination is doubly 
indirect; it depends on the value of scientific information that mayor 
may not be obtained as a result of contamination. As a practical matter, 
the ratio of the contamination penalty to the expected val,ue of the 
scientific returns of a space exploration program may be easier to deter-
mine than either of these two terms taken independently. 
3.1.5 A Powerful Solution Technigue Using Dynamic P-,_ogramming 
Another advantage of assessing a contamination penalty rather 
than a probability allocation is that it simplifies determining an optimal 
strategy. A chance constraint in itself is insufficient to define the 
value of a strategy. Furthermore, it offers no guide to decompose a 
complex problem into simpler subproblems. On the other hand, a contamina-
tion penalty together with explicit values assigned to other mission 
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outcomes permits strategies to be evaluated. Mission planning can be 
characterized as a sequential decision problem, and standard methods 
can be used to determine the best strategy. Such methods include deci-
sion trees, which are a special case of dynamic programming (see R. A. 
Hotoard [9] for an introduction to dynamic programming). 
In a sequential decision problem, each decision may affect future 
decisions; hence, the apparent difficulty of determining the first deci-
sion. With decision trees, in which alternatives and outcomes are dis-
crete as opposed to continuous, this problem is easily solved. In 
chronological order: (1) all the decisions and their probabilistic 
consequences are laid out, (2) values are assigned to the outcomes, and 
(3) each decision is optimized, starting with the final decisions. * 
Then, progressing from last to first, each decision is made knowing the 
optimal strategy for the rest of the sequence. This recursive induction 
process terminates when the initial decision has been reached. Thus, 
instead of having to solve simultaneously for all the decisions in a 
decision sequence, each decision can be analyzed separately. 
3.1.6 Iterative Reconciliation with Current Chance-Constraints 
If guidance to the mission planner is available not in the form 
of explicit values but only in the form of a chance-constraint, the 
optimal strategy he obtains by assuming values for the outcomes and 
using dynamic programming must be checked against these constraints. 
The general principle is simple. If the optimal strategy first 
obtained exceeds the maximum permissible probability of contamination, 
the contamination penalty has been underestimated and must be revis.ed 
upwards. It is clear that, if the contamination penalty is increased, 
strategies with large probabilities of contamination will become less 
and less desirable. The optimal strategies will therefore have lower 
probabilities of contamination until finally, for large enough penalty 
values, strategies with zero probability of contamination (e.g., "do 
nothing" alternative) will become best. 
* Practically, the steps are carried out first at a low level of detail. 
A first analysis will reveal the variables whose pOSSible variations 
will most affect the entire results. These variables are then care-
fully reassessed (usually by building a more detailed model) and the 
problem is reanalyzed. This iterative process stops when the cost of 
additional modeling and analysis is no longer justified by potential 
improvements of the optimal strategy. 
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Conversely, if the optimal strategy first obtained does not ex-
ceed the probabilitity allocation, the contamination penalty may be 
revised dOtilrmard in the hope of obtaining a strategy with a larger ex-
pected scientific value and a still-acceptable probability of contamina-
tion. 
The convergence of this process is studied in more detail in 
Section 3.2.2. 
3.2 Description of the Proposed Methodology 
Based on the needs and the design principles we have just discussed, 
the methodology we propose is: 
(1) Probability Consistency--To use the rules of probability 
theory, such as Bayes' PJle, to assess and revise proba-
bilities, including the probabilities of contamination. 
(2) Decision Formulation--To value explicitly project out-
comes, including the possible event of contamination, 
and thus permit the use of dynamic programming to select 
optimal strategies. 
(3) Iterative Reconciliation--To use a simple iterative 
process to obtain an optimal strategy compatible with 
a constraint on the probability of contamination of 
target planets or satellites while projects still re-
main subject to maximum permissible probabilities of 
contamination. 
3.2.1 The Task Seguence 
A step-by-step implementation of the proposed methodology includes 
the following tasks: 
(1) Layout the project decision tree. As noted above, 
a decision tree is a general description of the se-
quences of decisions and probabilistic outcomes, 
including the possibility of obtaining additional 
information. Care should be taken to incorporate 
all significant decision alternatives and to de-
scribe the information available and pertinent to 
the decision-making process at each decision stage. 
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(2~ Assess probabilities to outcomes. The probability of 
each outcome is assessed on the basis of all the in-
formation available before the outcome occurs. (Bayes' 
Rule is used where applicable.) 
(3) Assign values to outcomes. Value judgments fall into 
three classes: scientific values, costs, and contamina-
tion penalties for each planet (or satellite) visited 
during the project and subject to planetary quarantine 
requirements. If planning is carried out within an 
overall probability constraint, the contamination 
penalty will only serve as a coordinating signal, and 
the r~su1ts will be insensitive to the choice of an 
initial contamination penalty. At the guidance deci-
sion level, the value assignments can be made relative 
to a nominal mission value. At the mission design level, 
dollar values are necessary. 
(4) Find the optimal project strategy using dynamic program-
ming. (A criterion of maximizing net expected value 
will be used, but a more general risk attitude may be 
incorporated into the framework of dynamic programming 
by using expected utility theory. See [10].) 
(5) Compute the prior probabilities of contamination (for 
each planet or satellite) associated with the optimal 
strategy. 
(a) If a probability constraint is exceeded, increase 
the corresponding contamination penalty and return 
to step 4. 
(b) If a probability constraint is not reached, de-
crease the corresponding contamination penalty 
to allow for a possible larger scientific value 
and return to step 4. 
(6) Terminate the procedure when the contamination penal-
ties have reached the minimum nonnegative values 
compatible with the probability constraints. 
3.2.2 Convergence of the Iterative Process 
Mathematically, the selection of an optimal guidance strategy 
according to the currel· chance-constrained formulation can be written as 
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I 
maximize v(d) 
over d in S 
subject to Pj(d) S Qj for j = 1 to m 
d = (d1, d2, ••• , dn) = a strategy (vector of guidance 
decisions) for conducting a mission 
S = the set of physically possible strategies 
v(d) = the value of the mission lOith strategy d [v(d) 
represents the expected value] 
= the probability of contamination of planet j lOith 
strategy d 
Q. = the mission allocation for planet j 
J 
m = the number of planets visited during the mission and 
subject to planetary quarantine. 
(3-1) 
Figure 3.3 graphically represents this problem ,.,hen only one planet 
is subject to planetary quarantine. The set S of physically possible 
strategies has been plotted in an expected value (exclusive of contamina-
tion penalty) versus probability of contamination space. The mission 
allocation Q divides this set into a subset of feasible strategies (to 
the right of A). The strategy having the maximum expected value in the 
feasible subset, say d*(Q), is the optimal strategy. We lOill call the 
locus of d*(Q) as a function of Q the Pareto-optimal border (POB) of 
the set S. To any strategy not on the POB, there is a corresponding and 
preferable strategy on the POB; either a strategy on the POB lOill have 
a larger expected value for the same probability of contamination, or a 
lm.,er probability of contamination for the same expected value, or both. 
The POB of set S dralOn in Figure 3.3 is the curve OABCDE (lOe incorporate 
the "do nothing" alternative 0 in the set of strategies S). 
The proposed value iteration procedure can be formulated mathemati-
cally as 
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maximize v(d) 
over d in S 
:E j K.p.(d) J J 
,.here the contamination penalties 
Kj ~ 0 are chosen so that at the maximum d* 
) 
(3-2) 
This procedure is often referred to as a Lagrangian formulation, where 
the Kj's are the Lagrangian multipliers. 
The proposed value iteration procedure has an easy interpretation. 
Define expected net value as the expected value of a mission minus the 
expected contamination penalty, that is, v(d) - Kp(d). In Figure 3.3, 
we see that strategies of equal expected net value will lie on a straight 
line of slope K. Consider, then, all nonintersecting tangents to set S 
with nonnegative slopes K. We shall call their envelope the Pareto-
optimal convex envelope (POCE) of set S. It can be shown that the optimal 
strategies according to the proposed value itoration procedure must lie 
on this envelope. Their locus is therefore 0, curve segment BC, and 
curve segment DE. Consequently, the chance-constrained formulation and 
the proposed value iteration procedure do not always lead to the same 
optimal strategy. 
A sufficient condition for always obtaining the same optimal 
strategies with both procedures is that the POB and the POCE COincide, 
i.e., that the POB be convex. Mathematically, sufficient conditions 
for always obtaining the same optimal strategies with Eq. (3-1) and (3-2) 
is that (Kuhn-Tucker conditions) 
~ 1 to m (3-3) 
(See for example, [11], page 63, Section 1.3, for a discussion of con-
vexity, Kuhn-Tucker conditions and their relations to Lagrange multi-
pliers.) 
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3.2.3 The Issue of Convexity 
If strategy set S is not convex, there are mission allocations 
for which the POB does not coincide with the POCE. For example, to mis-
sion allocation Q' in Figure 3.3 corresponds Pareto-optimal strategy d
'
, 
belm< the POCE. Current NASA procedures might lead to the selection of 
strategy d' given mission allocation Q/. 
No contamination penalty, however, will lead to the selection of 
strategy d'. If the contamination penalty is slightly larger than the 
slope of the POCE at Q' (slope of line segment CD), a strategy close to 
C on curve BC will be selected. If the contamination penalty is slightly 
smaller than the slope of the POCE at Q', a strategy close to D on curve 
DE will be selected. If the contamination penalty is exactly equal to 
the slope of the POCE at Q', strategies C and D are equally desirable. 
Trade-off considerations permit verifying directly that a strategy 
on the POB that is not also on the POCE is always a poor choice. Con-
sider again strategy d' in Figure 3.3 and strategies C and D bordering 
the gap where the POB does not coincide with the paCE. The ratio of 
incremental value to incremental probability of contamination is larger 
between d' and D than it is between C and d' (the slope of line segment 
d'D· is larger than the slope of line segment Cd'). Therefore, if strategy 
d' is preferred to strategy C, then, a fortiori, strategy D should be 
preferred to strategy d'. Vice versa, if strategy d' is preferred to 
strategy D, then, a fortiori, strategy C should be preferred to strategy 
d': the expected value decrement per unit c,f contamination probability 
decrement is less between d' and C than it is between D and d'. Strategy 
d' or any strategy on the POB between C and D can never be preferred to 
both strategies C and D, i.e., the former are always poor choices. 
To determine how much better strategy C or D is than any inter-
mediate strategy on the POB between C and D, the expected ·contamination 
penalty must be taken into account, i.e., Eq. (3-2) and not (3-1) must 
be used. Graphically, the difference in expected net value is represented 
by the vertical distance between parallel lines of slope equal to the 
contamination penalty and drawn through the points C or D and d'. In 
particular, when the contamination penalty is exactly equal to the slope 
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of line segment CO, both strategies C and D are preferable to strategy d' 
by a quantity represented in Figure 3.3 by the vertical distance d'd" • * 
3.2.4 Extension of the strategy Set and the Value of Information 
Introducing new strategies can never reduce the value of a project 
if the old strategies remain unchanged. Either one of the new strategies 
is optimal and increases the value of the project or an old strategy re-
mains optimal and the value of the project is not affected. 
However, the new optimal strategy and its incremental value will 
depend on what procedure is used to determine the optimum. 
Figure 3.4 shows the addition of a new strategy set S2 to an old 
strategy set Sl' According to the chance-constrained formulation, 
optimal strategy A is replaced by optimal strategy C, whereas, using a 
contamination penalty, strategy A should be replaced by strategy B (using 
the same trade-off K' between incremental value and incremental probability 
of contamination). In the first case, the value increment is only C2-~' 
whereas in the second case, the value increment is E2-A2 • Conversely, 
if :1I is the correct trade-off, C is truly the new optimal strategy, but 
o and not A should have been the previously optimal strategy: the choice 
of A first and then C does not correspond to a consistent evaluation of 
the danger of contamination. 
A way to extend the strategy set is to introduce data gathering 
devices and make decisions conditional upon the new information. The 
value of the new information will generally be very sensitive to the 
method used to determine optimal strategies. The contamination penalty 
approach permits us to determine the value of information in a consistent 
manner provided the contamination penalty is not changed during the course 
of the mission design. 
* Point d" can be interpreted as the representation of a random mechanism 
selecting strategy C with probability p and strategy 0 with p:cobability 
(1 - p). The arbitrary nature of the probability constraint Q' can be 
shOl<Q by the fact that a randomized strategy between C and 0 can offer 
a higher expected value than strategy d' for the same probability of 
contamination. We are not advocating the use of random strategies for 
space mission planning; we see this result as an artificial and unde-
sirable consequence of the probability constraint formulation. 
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3.3 A Tutorial Application 
3.3.1 The Basic Mission 
3.3.1.1 Description 
The example used in this section is an extremely simplified 
representation of a two-maneuver fly-by mission. Only those elements 
that are essential for a demonstration of the new methodology have been 
retained. In particular, the number of possible strategies has been 
kept to a minimum so that they may easily be identified and evaluated. 
A more realistic example is presented in Section 4. 
The basic mission depicted in Figure 3.5 shm.s two corrective 
maneuvers. Each maneuver offers a choice bet"tveen a !lclosett and a "far" 
fly-by. The first maneuver, dl , is always performed, but the second 
maneuver, d2, may not be performed because of a failure of the guidance 
system or of the propulsion system. The probability of failure of at 
least one of these two systems is f = 1 X 10-2 and is assumed to be in-
dependent of the first choice of fly-by altitude. 
The probabilities of impact after each maneuver are given belm.: 
Probability 
Maneuver Decision of Impact 
First maneuver followed Close 4 X 10-
2 
by failure of guidance 
10-4 or propulsion system Far 4 x 
Second maneuver Close 1 x 10-3 
Far 1 X 10-5 
In all cases, the probability of contamination given impact is 5.5 x 10-2 • 
A relative value scale is defined by the two following assign-
ments: 100 is assigned to a nominal flight consisting of two successful 
"close" fly-by decisions; a value of zero is assigned to the impact out-
come. The other values are indicated on the value tree in Figure 3.6. 
Note that biasing the trajectory away from the target planet (making a 
first decision to fly by "far") simply penalizes the rest of the mission 
by 10. 
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FIGURE 3.5 
STRUCTURE OF THE BASIC MISSION 
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FIGURE 3.6 
RELAT!VE VALUE TREE FOR THE BASIC MISSION 
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More realistic values could have been assigned, but these are 
sufficient for the purpose of this illustration and permit simplifying 
the graphical representation of the mission in Figure 3.5. In that 
figure, only one tree has been drawn to represent the second maneuver 
regardless of the decision for the first maneuver; the differential of 
10 between the two alternatives for the first maneuver is directly 
represented by a -10 on the "far" branch of the first decision. If the 
second maneuver cannot be executed, the expected value of the mission 
is assumed equal to zero. The results are insensitive to this assump-
tion in view of the small probability of failure. 
Finally, toe assume the basic mission has been allocated a proba-
bility of contamination of 6 X 10-5 • 
3.3.1.2 Direct Inspection of Strategies 
The four possib,le strategies for conducting the basic mission 
are described in Table 3.1 and Figure 3.7. Table 3.1 shows that strate-
gies having the high expected values also have the high probabilities 
of contamination. For example, Strategy 1, which corresponds to two 
choices of "close" trajectories, has an expected value of 
100 X (Pr. no failure) X (Pr. no impact) 
= 100 X (0.99) X (0.999) 
= 99 
and a probability of contamination of 
[(
pr. impact course ) 
after first maneuver X (Pr. failure) 
+ (Pr. no failure) X (pr. impact after)] second maneuver 
X (Pr. contamination given impact) 
= [(0.04)(0.01) + (0.99)(0.001)J (0.055) 
= 7.7 X 10-5 
Strategy 1 is the most valuable of all, but because the proba-
bility of contamination exceeds the mission allocation of 6 x 10-5, it 
must be rejected. A rapid inspection of Table 3.1 shot~s that the three 
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other strategies are acceptable, and among them, Strategy 3 has the 
highest expected value. Strategy 3 is therefore the optimal solution. 
Table 3.1 
BASIC MISSION STRATEGIES 
Decisions 
Strategy First Second Expected Probability of 
Number Maneuver Maneuver Value Contamination 
1 close close 99 7.7 X lO-S 
2 close far S9 2.2 X 10-S 
3 far close 89 S.S X lO-S 
4 far far 49 7.7 X 10-
7 
Note: All the numbers have only two significant digits. 
3.3.1.3 Determination of Optimal Strategy 
Using the Value Iteration Process 
Let us assign a penalty K to the contamination event. The first 
step is to determine a range of values of K such that the contamination 
penalty will rule out some of the strategies. If value differences among 
strategies were counted in tens of millions of dollars, and probabilities 
of contamination are in the range of 10-S to 10-4 , then pertinent values 
of the contamination penalty would therefore lie in the range 107 /10-4 ~ lOll 
to 107/l0-S ~ 1012, one hundred billion to one trillion dollars. 
The next step is to pick a value of K in the range of interest, 
say S X lOS, and determine the best strategy. A quick analysis (see 
Figure 3.5) shows that following a "close" decision for the first maneuver, 
the expected value for a "close" decision on the second maneuver is 
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1 x 10-4 
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1 j' 
1 
(Pr. no impact) x (value) 
. ) (pr. contamination) Lmpact X . . gLven Lmpact (Pr. X K 
= (0.999) X (100) - (0.001) X (0.055) X 5 X 105 
= 72.4 
Like«ise, the expected value for a "far" decision on the second maneuver 
is 
-5 -5 5 (1 - 10 ) X (60) - (10 ) X (0.055) X 5 x 10 
= 60.01 
Decision d2 = "close" is therefore preferable «hen dl = "close." The 
same conclusion holds «hen dl = "far," the only difference being a uni-
form reduction of 10 in expected value. 
The best alternative for the first decision is selected in 
the same manner, given that the best strategy for the second mission 
is .al«ays to fly by "close." The expected value of the mission «ith 
d1 = "close" is 
(Pr. no failure) X (value) 
(
pr. contamination) 
- (Pr. failure) X (Pr. impact) X " X K gLven Lmpact 
= (0.99) X (72.4) - (0.01) X (0.04) X (0.055) X 5 X 105 
= 60.7 
Like«ise, the expected value of the mission «ith dl = "far" is 
(0.99) X (72.4 - 10) - (0.01) X (4 x 10-4 ) X (0.055) X 5 X 105 
= 61.7 
Decision dl = "far" is therefore slightly better than dl = "close." 
5 The best strategy «ith a contamination penalty of 5 X 10 is 
therefore the third strategy listed in Table 3.1. The expected net value 
is 61.7 
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If all the values were expressed in millions of dollars and the 
planetary quarantine policy stipulated that the contamination penalty 
for the target planet be taken equal to 5 X 105 million dollars, we 
would have found the optimal strategy and the iteration would be over. 
Suppose, however, that the mission has been given a probability 
allocation of 6 X 10-5, as we assumed at the beginning of this section. 
The strategy obtained with K = 5 X 105 has a probability of contamina-
tion of 5.5 X 10-5 • We could therefore diminish the contamination penalty 
in the hope of finding a strategy with a larger scientific value and a 
probability of contamination larger than 5.5 x 10-5, but still less than 
6 X 10-5 • 
The choices of strategies and the corresponding expected net 
values have been represented in Table 3.2 and Figure 3.8 for values of 
K ranging from 0 to 106• 
Table 3.2 
CHOICES OF STRATEGY FOR THE BASIC MISSION 
AS A FUNCTION OF THE CONTAMINATION PENALTY K 
Contamination Penalty 
{1052 Optimal 
_F!:2!!l..- To Strategy 
0 4.5 1 
4.5 7.3 3 
7.3 infinity 4 
For K = 0, the strategies have the expected values shown in 
Table 3.1. When K increases, the expected net values decrease linearly; 
the slopes correspond to the probabilities of contamination for each 
strategy. Thus, Strategy 1 starts with the highest expected value 
for K = 0, but is very sensitive to the contamination penalty. When 
K = 4.5 X 105, Strategy 3 becomes more valuable than Strategy 1; Strategy 
3 is finally supplanted by Strategy 4 when K reaches 7.3 X 105. Regard-
less of the cost of contamination, Strategy 2 is always a poor candidate. 
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FIGURE 3.8 
EXPECTED NET VALUES FOR THE FOUR 
STRATEGIES OF THE BASIC MISSION 
4.5 7.3 
CONTAMlrJATION PENALTY 
(unit = 1 x 105) 
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3.3.1.4 Interpretation of the Value ILeration Process 
in the Strategy Space 
The same results could also be read in Figure 3.7. First, let 
us draw a Pareto-optimal convex envelope (POCE) to the set of available 
strategies by joining each pair of strategies by line segments, and 
keeping the upper left edge of the polygon that has been created. In 
Figure 3.7 we find that the POCE·consists of line segments joining 
Strategy 1 to 3 and 3 to 4. Strategy 2 lies belot. the line segment join-
ing Strategy 3 to 4. 
The various slopes of the POCE can be interpreted as trade-offs 
bett.een expected value and probability of contamination. Thus the slope 
of the line segment joining Strategy 1 to 3 is equal to 
(99 - 89) 5 -----'-'c:---...:~--- ~ 4.5 y. 10 
(7.7 X 10-5 - 5.5 y. 10-5 
Strategy 1 should therefore be preferred to Strategy 3 when the contamina-
tion penalty is less than 4.5 y. 105, and vice versa. The same argument 
applies to a comparison of Strategies 3 and 4 tvith, this time, a slope 
or trade-off value of 7.3 X 105. Strategy 2 lying below the line seg-
ment joining Strategies 3 and 4 is not selected with any trade-off value. 
3.3.1.5 The Issue of Convexity 
If the mission allocation had been less than 5.5 X 10-5 but 
more than 2.2 y. 10-5, Strategy 2 would have been selected on an expected 
value basis exclusive of contamination penalty. The iterative reconcilia-
tion process would indicate, however, that the contamination penalty 
derived from the mission allocation is at least equal to 7.3 X 105. Under 
these circumstances, Strategy 4 is alt.ays prefereable to Strategy 2 on 
an expected net value basis including the contamination penalty. Mathe-
matically, 
49 - K X 7.7 X 10-7 > 59 - K X 2.2 X 10-5 
as long as 
-5 -7 5 K> (59 - 49)/{2.2 x 10 - 7.7 X 10 ) ~ 4.5 X 10 
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In fact, given that K = 7.3 X 105, the smallest contamination 
penalty compatible with the mission allocation, the expected net value 
of Strategy 2 is 
5 -5 59 - 7.3 X 10 X 2.2 X 10 ~ 43 , 
whereas the expected net value of Strategy 4 is 
49 - 7.3 X 105 X 7.7 X 10-7 _ 49 
In other ,~ords, given that the contamination penalty is at least 
equal to 7.3 X 105, it is better to select Strategy 4 instead of 2; a re-
duction of the probability of contamination from 2.2 X 10-5 to 7.7 X 10-7 
is worth at least 16, whereas the corresponding decrease in expected 
scientific value is only 10. Note also that, if the contamination penalty 
is exactly equal to 7.3 X 105, Strategy ~ has the same expected net value 
as Strategy 4 (89 - 7.3 X 105 X 5.5 X 10-5 = 49). 
We therefore believe that strategies that lie below the POCE of 
the strategy set, such as Strategy 2 in Figure 3.7, should never be 
selected. There are always better straLegies on the POCE, and at least 
one of them has an acceptable probability of contamination. 
3.3.2 The New Mission (Basic Mission with Temperature Sensor) 
3.3.2.1 Description 
The purpose of the refinement of a temperature sensor is to 
demonstrate hm' information gained during the flight can be used to 
improve the guidance decisions. We assume that surface temperature 
readings of the target planet are available a few days before the second 
maneuver. The probability of contamination given impact can therefore 
be reassessed, and the second maneuver can be made on the basis of better 
information. We will show that, consequently, the expected value of the 
mission can only be increased. 
For the sake of simplicity, we shall assume that there are only 
two possible temperature readings: high and low. Knowledge of the ac-
curacy of the temperature sensor and prior knowledge of the target planet's 
surface temperature indicate (using Bayesian inference) the follm~ing: 
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Temperature 
Reading 
High 
Low 
Probability 
0.5 
0.5 
Conditional Probability 
of Contamination Given Impact 
and Temperature Reading 
0.1 
0.01 
Figure 3.9 shows the structure of the basic mission expanded to 
include the new temperature information. We now distinguish two deci-
sions for the second maneuver, each decision being conditional on a 
temperature reading. The new probabilities of contamination given impact 
replace the old average of 5.5 X 10-2 • All the other elements of the 
new mission are the same as in the basic mission. 
3.3.2.2 Direct Inspection of Strategies 
There are eight strategies for conducting the new mission. Four 
of them are identical to the four strategies of the basic mission (where 
the second maneuver is independent of the temperature reading) and are 
denoted by the same numbers. In the four new strategies, the second 
maneuver is conditional upon the temperature reading. These strategies 
have been numbered from I' to 4', according to their similarities with 
each of the four unconditional strategies. 
Table 3.3 and Figure 3.10 represent the expected values and the 
probabilities of contamination of each of these eight strategies. A 
quick inspection reveals that Strategies 2' and 4' have much larger ex-
pected values and only slightly larger probabilities of contamination 
than their nonprimed counterparts. In these strategies, advantage is 
taken of a low temperature reading to fly by "close" instead of always 
"far." On the other hand, Strategies I' and 3' seem to be worse than 
their nonprimed counterparts. Indeed, it is counter-intuitive to fly 
by "far" when the temperature reading is low, instead of always flying 
by "close." 
Strategy 3 still has the hi£hest expected value among the feasi-
ble strategies (with a probability of contamination less than or equal 
to 6 X 10-5). Therefore, according to the chance-constrained formula-
tion, the same guidance strategy should be selected with or without the 
temperature information. The scientific value of the surface tempera-
ture data might be very high, but the value of the data for improving 
guidance decisions is null. 
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FIGURE 3.9 
STRUCTURE OF THE NEW MISSION (BASIC MISSION WITH TEMPERATURE SENSOR) 
(0.055) 
*[2.2 x 10-51 (0.1) *[5 x 10-5] 
(0.04) r< Ves (10-3) Ves 
CONTAMINATION 
Ves CONTAMINATION (~ \ (0.945) 0 Close (0.9) 0 Ves IMPACT No IMPACT No 
(0.96) 0 (-1) 100 
No - No FAILURE (0.1 ) TO PERFORM SECOND * [5 x 10-7[ 
SECOND MANEUVER MANEUVER (10-5) Ves 
Ves 
CO NTAMINATION 
~ (0.9) IMPACT 0 No \ I No (-1) 
60 
No 
a- n FIRST o TEMPERATURE (0.01) 
*[5 x 10-6] .... MANEUVER READING Ves 
CONTAMINATION 
(0.99) ! (0.99) 0 IMPACT 
No No -
FAILURE 
(- 1) 
100 
TO PERFORM No 
SECOND MANEUVER (0.055) (0.01) *(5 x 10-8] 
(4 x 10~) Ves (10-5) Ves 
Ves 
CONTAMINATIOrl CONTAMINATION 
(0.945) (0.99) 
IMPACT 0 0 
Ves '--< (0.9996) No - No 
0 60 
No - No -
o = Decision node; 0 = Chance node; * = Contamination; () = Probability; [] = Probability of contamination; __ = Expected value 
NOTE: The con5lquences of the ycond maneuver af' differentiated only by the results of the temperature reading and the -10 penalty associ.ted with the 
first maneuver "far". Ther1lfore, the consequences of the first maneuver when a second maneuver is possible have beun coalesced and I singl. tn. 
has been drawn for the temperature reading Ind the second maneuver. 
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Strategy 
Number 
1 
I' 
2 ' 
2 
3 
3 ' 
4' 
4 
Table 3.3 
NEW MISSION STRATEGIES 
Decisions 
First Second Maneuver 
Maneuver High Temp. Low Temp. 
close close close 
close close far 
close far close 
close far far 
far close close 
far close far 
far far close 
far far far 
__________ 1 __ 
Expected 
Value 
99 
79 
79 
59 
89 
69 
69 
49 
Probability 
Contamination 
(10-5) 
7.7 
7.2 
2.7 
2.2 
5.5 
5.0 
0.57 
0.077 
Note: All numbers have only two significant digits. 
3.3.2.3 Determination of Optimal Strategy 
Using the Value Iteration Process 
We shall not repeat the determination of optimal strategies 
using contamination penalties (see Section 3.3.1.3), but simply present 
the results. 
Figure 3.10 shows or,ly 4 strategies on the Pareto-optimal convex 
envelope. They are Strategies 1, 2', 4', and 4. The slopes of the convex 
envelope between these strategies are 4 X 105, 4.5 X 105, and 40 X 105, 
respectively. These results are confirmed in Table 3.4 and Figure 3.11, 
where the expected net value of each strategy is plotted versus the con-
tamination pepalty. 
Note that Strategy 3, optimal according to the chance-constrained 
formulation, lies slightly below the POCE and therefore would not be se-
lected with the value iteration approach. Furthermore, if Strategy 3 
is the right choice for the basic mission, then the contamination penalty 
should be in the range of 4.7 X 105 to 7.3 Y. lOS, The only optimal 
strategy in that contamination penalty range for the net< mission is 
Strategy 4' , 
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FIGURE 3.10 
NEW MISSION STRATEGIES 
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Table 3.4 
CHOICES·OF STRATEGY FOR THE NEH MISSION 
AS A FUNCTION OF THE CONTAMINATION PENALTY K 
Contamination Penalty 
(1052 Optimal 
From To Strategy 
0 4 1 
4 4.5 2 ' 
4.5 40 4' 
40 infinity 4 
Note, too, that in practice, the assessment of the expected 
value and the probability of contamination associated with a particular 
strategy are ah.ays subject to uncertainty. Therefore, a strategy lying 
near the POCE should not be rejected hastily; the value of reexamining 
this strategy and the neighboring strategies can be analyzed. 
3.3.2.4 The Expected Value of Information 
The chance-constrained formulation ah.ays suggests selecting 
Strategy 3 IOhether or not temperature information is available. There-
fore, the chance-constrained formulation does not show any guidance 
decision-making value for the temperature measuring device. 
Introducing a contamination penalty sholOs that if Strategy 3 
is selected for the basic mission, then Strategy 4' should be selected 
for the new mission. However, Strategy 4' has an expected value of 69 
only, IOhereas Strategy 3 has an expected value of 89. IE the expected 
value of the temperature information equal to -20? No; IOe must also 
take into account the probabilities of contamination associated IOith 
each s~rategy. 
A look at Figure 3.11 will reveal that, in the range K = 4.5 X 105 
to 7.3 X 105, Strategy 4' allOays has an expected net value including con-
tamination penalty larger than Strategy 3. For example, if IOe believe 
that the contamination penalty should be K = 5 X 105, the difference 
betlOeen the expected net values of Strategies 4' and 3 is 
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FIGURE 3.11 
EXPECTED NET VALUES FOR THE EIGHT STRATEGIES 
OF THE NEW MISSION 
--
-----
---
-r-~----~~~~~~--~ 
4 4.5 
CONTAMINATION PENALTY 
(unit = 1 x 105) 
10 
) 
Intersection 
at K = 40 
66.4 - 61.7 = 4.7 
In other words, the temperature information is expected to be 'vorth 4.5 
simply because it permits improving the guidance strategy. After a high 
temperature reading, we will not take the risk of flying by "close," 
which was inherent to Strategy 3. The savings are: (1) in scientific 
value, 60 - 100 = -40, and (2) in contamination penalty, 
-4 -6 5 (1 x 10 - 1 x 10 ) y. 5 x 10 = 49.5 
and therefore (3) in total, 49.5 - 40 = 9.5. 
ing having a probability of 0.5, the expected 
as we read in Figure 3.11. 
The high temperature read-
savings are 9.5 X 0.5 = 4.7, 
Finally, we should note that determining the incremental value 
of the new mission (with the temperature sensor) over the basic mission 
could be pertinent for mission design decisions. If a choice had to 
be made between designs with and without the temperature sensor, carry-
ing out the analysis above with dollar values would indicate the value of 
using the temperature sensor that could be expected solely from an im-
provement of the guidance decision. The sum of this expected value and 
the scientific value of surface temperature readings could then be com-
pared to the cost of adding a temperature sensor to the basic mission. 
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4 A JUPITER ORBITER MISSION 
4.1 Scope and Objective of the Application 
The Jupiter Orbiter mission is a particularly appropriate applica-
tion for the ne;; methodology ,~e proposed in Section 3. A Mariner or 
Pionser spacecraft could be sent to orbit Jupiter and explore the Jovian 
system for a period of years. 
It has been de,;onstrated (see [12]) that, using a succession of 
small propulsive changes of ve10city and the gravitational assistance of 
the Galilean satellites, a great variety o~ trajectories can be obtained. 
Thus, a single spacecraft can therefore collect a wealth of information 
by performing particle and field experiments from a few to a hundred 
Jupiter radii, and imaging experiments during repeated encounters with 
the major Jovian satellites. 
The planning of such a mission is, of course, complex. The number 
of possible guidance strategies seems to be practically limitless, and 
the variety of sometimes conflicting scientific objectives requires the 
assessment of many trade-offs. 
From a planetary quarantine point of View, the problems seem unprece-
dented. The spacecraft ',~ill repeatedly fly by several celestial bodies, 
bodies that, although not well-known, are considered of potential bio-
logical interest. Moreover, there is no easy meanS of disposing of the 
spacecraft at the end of the period of controllable flight. A solution 
must be found that will guarantee that the planetary quarantine require-
ments will be met for the next few decades. 
We have divided this application into two parts: first a tutorial 
analysis of the maneuver to insert the spacecraft into ,Jupiter orbit 
using the gravitational assistance of Ganymede; second, a survey of the 
complete mission to identify the major obstacles that must be cleared to 
satisfy the planetary quarantine requirements. 
In the first part, the insertion maneuver is treated as a complete 
mission consisting of a single fly-by of Ganymede. The analysis does 
not pretend to solve this maneuver; rather, it demonstrates how realistic 
elements can be taken into account in such an analysis. 
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The second part is necessarily sketchy, given the early stage of 
planning of a JO mission. However, we have been able to point out major 
difficulties that will require planetary quarantine research as well as 
the attention of the mission planner. 
4.2 The Insertion Maneuver into Jupiter Orbit 
4.2.1 Problem Structure 
4.2.1.1 The Fly-By Altitude Decision 
The problem structure is depicted by the decision cree in Figure 
4.1. We aSSume the spacecraft will use the gravitational assistance of 
Ganymede to enter into Jupiter orbit. A close fly-by of Ganymede would 
permit large fuel savings. However, Ganymede is a satellite of potential 
biological interest and the planetary quarantine requirements do conflict 
with fuel savings. We will limit our attention to this particular de-
cision: the choice of a fly-by altitude H during the last maneuver be-
fore encounter with Ganymede (approximately four days before encounter). 
We assume that the other concomitant decisions (which are not crucial 
from a planetary quarantine point of view) are optimized independently. 
4.2.1.2 Information for the Fly-By Altitude Decision 
We assume there will be available two critical elements of in-
formation on which to base the fly-by altitude decision: one is the 
availability of the guidance system and the other, a surface temperature 
reading of Ganymede. 
4.2.1.2.1 Availability of the Guidance System 
The JO could be equipped with a high precision optical guidance 
system (using the spacecraft TV camera) in addition ~o a regular radio 
guidance system. For a given probability of impact, the optical and radio 
guidance systems permit a lm'1er fly-by altitude than the radio guidance 
system alone. 
We define three possible states of the guidance system with 
probabilities as indicated below: 
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FIGURE 4.1 
DECISION TREE FOR INSERTION MANEUVER 
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TRAJECTORY 
\ 
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''----------
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PREVIOUS CORRECTIVE MANEUVER 
(JUPITER - 30 days) 
' -
" 
r 
I 
Symbol Definition 
Optical and radio systems function 
Only radio system functions 
No guidance system available 
Probability 
0.99 
0.01 
1 X lO-S 
The probabilities of impact given states Gl and G2 of the guidance system 
and fly-by altitude H are plotted in Figure 4.2 (from [13]). 
4.2.1.2.2 Surface Temperature Reading 
A temperature sensor may be part of the JO IS scier,tific pay-
load. This instrument will, among other things, provide precise surface 
temperature readings of planets, starting several days before encounter. 
The average surface temperature of Ganymede is believed to be on the order 
of -120°C, but it is not known ,~ith precision. A uniform temperature of 
-120°C would be a major obstacle to the development of life. However, 
some experts have tentatively assessed a probability of growth of ter-
restrial organisms on Ganymede as high as 0.1 (see [1]). We interpret 
this assessment as meaning that there is a small probability of finding 
localized surface temperatures as high as OOC. Our major conclusions are 
not very sensitive to this assumption. 
Figure 4.3 shows four curves pertinent to determining of the 
probability of grmvth p of terrestrial organisms on Ganymede. The two 
dotted lines are cumula~ive probability distributions. One represents 
an assessment of the prior probability that the maximum surface tempera-
ture T will not exceed the value indicated on the abscissa. For example, 
there is a probability of 0.6 that T will be less than -4Soc. The second 
dotted line is a two-step discrete approximation of the first curve. 
Thus, assuming the temperature sensor to be well-caJ ibrated and precise, 
we may simplify the description of the temperature information received 
by assuming two equally likely temperature readings Tl = -2SoC and T2 = 
-7SoC. 
The two solid curves represent probabilities of growth. The 
first one is the probability of growth of a terrestrL"l organism On Gany-
mede at temperature T (approximated from [14]). The second curve indi-
cates the probability of growth given that a maximum surface temperature 
of T has been observed. We assume that if T is larger than _100°C, then 
any temperature between -100°C and T can b~ found somewhere on Ganymede. 
Therefore, the second curve coincides with T as T increases from -100°C 
to OoC and p (T) increases simultaneously from 1 X 10-S to 1. Then, for 
g 
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FIGURE 4.2 
PROBABILITY OF IMPACT ON GANYMEDE Pi (G,H) 
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FIGURE 4.3 
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T above 65°C, P (T) begins to decrease, but the probability of growth some-
where on Ganyme~e remains equal to 1. For the temperature readings Tl and 
T
2
, the probabilities of grm<th are 0.2 and 1 X 10-4, respectively. 
The probability of growth is one of the factors required to 
compute the probability of contamination given impact of the spacecraft. 
A careful contamination analysis also includes a description of the space-
craft bioload by type of organisms and location on the spacecraft and a 
model for the release and propagation of organisms follm<ing an impact. 
We shall assume t.hat a contamination analysis indicates probabilities of 
contamination given impact of 1, and 0.01 given probabilities of growth 
of 0.2 and 1 X 10-4 , respectively. 
The information from the temperature sensor and its consequences 
on contamination probabilities are summarized below: 
Temperature 
Reading 
Probability 
0.5 
0.5 
Temperature (T) 
Probability 
of Grm<th (p g) 
0.2 
-4 1 X 10 
Probability of 
Contamination 
Given Impact (p ) 
c 
1.0 
0.01 
The combination of the two likely states of the guidance sys-
tem (Gl and GZ) and the two possible t,,,mperature readings torm four states 
of nature that will condition the fly-by altitude decision. 
4.2.1.3 Outcomes 
The consequences of a fly-by altitude decision H can be decom-
posed as shown in Figure 4.1. First, the insertion maneuver may not be 
executed because of a failure of the main propulsion system. The proba-
bility of failure is f = 0.01 and is assumed independent of the state of 
the guidance system. The consequences of a failure depend on the last 
maneuver executed and are of no direct concern for the decision at hand. 
(We shall consider the consequences of a failure in some detail in Section 
4.3.) If the propulSion system does not fail, the consequences can be 
divided between impact trajectories [probability p.(G,H)] and nonimpact 
~ trajectories. 
Orbit determination procedures will permit detecting an impact 
trajectory in time to execute an emergency maneuver. The emergency 
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maneuver ',Till fail with probability q = 0.01, given that the main pro-
pulsion sy3tem functioned shortly before for the insertion maneuver. Im-
pact is avoided when the emergency maneuver succeeds. 
4.2.2 Values 
MOl;t of the values associated '''ith the outcomes of the insertion 
maneuver are indirect values except, of course, for the impact outcome. 
We, have assumed that except for the choice of the fly-by altitude 
H, all other concomitant decisions were solved independently, e.g., we 
have assumed that an optimal balance had been reached between orbit param-
eters and fuel consumption by analyzing the subsequent phases of the 
mission. 
We shall therefore consider the expected value of the mission as 
a function of the fly-by altitude decision as given. For the sake of 
simplicity, we have adopted the expected value function sho,vu in Figure 
4.4 and Table 4.1. A value of 100 has been assigned to a nominal fly-by 
(T = Tl , G = Gl , H = 1000 km, and so forth), and a value of zero has 
been assigned to an impact (exclusive of contamination penalty). All the 
other values are relative to this scale. For example, a fly-by at an alti-
tude of 2000 km reduces the amount of fuel available for the rest of the 
mission by 25 percent. We have assumed that, as a result, the value of 
the mission woul-l be reduced by 20 percent. 
Failure of the optical guidance system has two effects: (1) re-
duction of the scientific value to be expected from a given flight and 
(2) increase in the fuel requirements to control a given flight, hence 
the parameters assigned to the value function given failure of the opti-
cal system. 
Finally, if the spacecraft is successfully removed from an impact 
trajectory by an emergency maneuver, we assume that the expected value of 
the mission given a fly-by aiming point decision is the same as if the 
spacecraft had never been on an impact trajectory. The analytical resul.ts 
are not sensitive to this assumption except in the extreme case of a de-
cision to fly by very low, leading tn a high probability of impact. 
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FIGURE 4.4 
INSERTION MANEUVER VALUE AS A FUNCTION 
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Tabie 4.1 
VALUE FUNCTION PARAMETERS FOR THE 
INSERTION MANEUVER 
Guidance System 
Optical (Gl ) 
Radio only (G2) 
4.2.3 Analysis 
4.2.3.1 Formulation 
Value at 
H = 103 km 
100 
80 
Slope 
(per 103 km) 
-20 
-30 
In analyzing the fly-by altitude decision, we are concerned only 
by the sequences of an execution of this decision. These consequences 
are found on the upper right quadrant of Figure 4.1, on the branches fol-
lowing a reliable performance of the propulsion system. The expected 
value of the mission given the execution of the fly-by maneuver is 
(1 - p.(G,H)q)v(G,H) - Kp.(G,H)qp (T) 
~ ~ c 
(4-1) 
where K is the contamination oena1ty. The prior probability of contami-
nation is 
""' r(T,G)p.(G,H)qp (T) L.J ~ c , (4-2) 
T,G 
where r(T,G) is the probability of temperature reading T and state of the 
guidance system G. 
The optimization of the fly-by altitude decisjon subject to a 
probability constraint Q can therefore be written as 
maximize 
over H 
(1 - P.q)v - Kp.qp 
~ ~ c 
subject to '2:rPiqpC';;Q 
T,G 
76 
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4.2.3.2 Choice of an Initial Contamination Penalty K 
Consider a likely state of nature such as the state where the 
optical guidance system is available and the surface temperature reading 
is high, i.e., T = Tl and G = Gl . Let us find a contamination penalty K 
that would lead u"der these circumstances to an optimal fly-by with a 
probability of contamination of 1 X 10-5 . 
The probability of contamination due to the insertion maneuver 
is Pi(Gl,H)qpc(Tl ). If it is limited to 1 X 10-
5
, the probability of 
impact should be 
1 X 10-5 3 
-=-"-'=-- = 1 X 10-
0.01 X 1 (4-4) 
and the fly-by altitude decision should be H = 500 km (see Figure 4.2). 
With this small probability of impact, the eKpected value of the 
mission, Eq. (4-1), reduces approKimately to 
(4-5) 
The eKpected value is maKimum when the differential of Eq. (4-5) with 
respect to H at H = 500 km is null, that is, when 
But we know, according to Table 4.1, that 
= -20/1000 km 
H = 500 km 
and, also according to Figure 4.2, that 
= -2 X 10-3/100 km 
H = 500 km 
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(4-6) 
(4-7) 
(4-8) 
) 
I 
I 
I 
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We find, therefore, that the initial value of the contamination penalty 
K can be chosen as 
( 6::' / fili) K = -'-""-'7'-""",-'--(6p .I6H)qp 
~ c 
-2 5 
-----"----=10 
-2 X 10-3 X 10-2 
4.2.3.3 The Value Iteration Process 
4 2 3 K = 105 . .3. .1 
(4-9) 
We could again represent the strategy set in an expected value 
versus probability of contamination plane. However, since there are four 
likely states of nature and the fly-by altitude decision is continuous, 
each strategy would be difficult to identify. Figure 4.5 is a simpler 
picture representing the expected value and the expected contamination 
penalty as functions of the fly-by altitude H for the value K = 105. 
As can be seen in Figure 4.5, the expected contamination 
penalty is negligible for high fly-by altitudes, and increases sharply 
when the fly-by altitude is lowered. It is therefore easy to determine 
the fly-by altitudes leading to the maximum expected net values. These 
values are represented in Figure 4.5 and Table 4.2. 
When the temperature reading is low (T2) and only the radio 
guidance system is available (G2), the planetary quarantine reqUirement 
is not binding; that is, the fly-by altitude is not affected by the COn-
tamination penalty. In this case, an emergency maneuver to remove the 
spacecraft from impact trajectory becomes likely, and the optimization 
of the fly-by altitude decision depends critically on the value assigned 
to a successful removal from impact. For simplicity, we have assumed 
this value to be equal to v(G,H), the expected value of the fly-by when 
one spacecraft is not on an impact trajectory; a more careful value as-
signment would be needed in this particular case. 
In the three other states of nature, the contamination penalty 
is binding and leads to sharp optima. 
The prior probability of contamination for the insertion 
maneuver is found to be approximately 1 X 10-5 , half the mission alloca-
tion. A smaller contamination penalty should be tried next. 
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'" 0 
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State Temperature 
of Reading 
Nature T 
1 Tl 
2 Tl 
3 TZ 
4 T2 
* 
State 
of 
Table 4.2 
OPTIMAL GANYMEDE FLY-BY ALTITUDE DECISION 
FIRST ITERATION: CONTAMINATION PENALTY K = 105 
Ganymede Probability 
Probability Fly-by of 
Guidance of State Altitude Probability Contamination 
System of Nature Decision of Impact Given Impact 
G r (T..QL.. H (km) Pi Pc 
Gl 0.495 500 1 X 10-
3 1.0 
G2 0.005 1300 5 X 10-
3 1.0 
Gl 0.495 250 0.1 0.01 
~ 
G 0.005 negative 1.0" 0.01 2 
Probability of 
Contamination 
Conditional Total 
p.qp rPiqpc d'o-f ) (10-5) 
1.0 0.495 
5.0 0.025 
1.0 0.495 
10.0* 0.050* 
Prior probability of contamination p(C) ~ 1 X 10-5 
These numbers depend critically on the value assigned to the outcome of a successful emergency 
maneuver ;,,' remove the spacecraft from impac t traj ec tory. More realistic values would require 
further refinements of the current model. 
~'~."'----~-~- -~-~'- -~-~~-~~----,--,~~-,-~-.,--- , .11 _____ , ~' __ , ______ :~ 
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4.2.3.3.2 K ~ 5 X 104 
The value iteration process will normally be carried out using 
a standard computerized search method. In this illustration, we use the 
following heuristic to guess at the next trial value of K: since 
log (Pi (H» is approximately linear for most values of H (see Figure 4.2) 
and K is inversely proportional to ~p./~H [see Eq. (4-9)1, to double the 
1-probability of contamination, we cut the contamination penalty in half. 
The new results are represented in Table 4.3. The prior proba-
bility of contamination has jumped to 6 X 10-5, far in excess of the mis-
sion allocation Q ~ 2 X 10-5 The largest contribution to the probability 
of contamination comes from the third state of nature, T ~ T2 and G ~ Gl (high temperature reading and optical guidance system functioning); the 
new contamination penalty K ~ 5 X 104 is no longer binding. Note also 
that the probabilities of contamination conditional upon each state of 
nature exceed the mission allocation in all cases except the first one 
(T ~ Tl , G ~ Gl ). 
The contamination penalty must be revised upwards to reduce 
the prior probability of contamination. 
4.2.3.3.3 K ~ 7.5 X 104 
We shall rely again on a heuristic to guess at the next trial 
value of K. The value K ~ 5 X 1~4 leads to an excessive probability of 
contamination because it is not binding for the third state of nature 
(T ~ T2, G ~ Gl ); the smallest value of K that is still binding can be 
obtained as follows: From Figure 4.2 we can compute 
and therefore, from Eq. (4-7), we compute 
K ~ ___ -'-2=--____ ~ 7.14 X 104 
-0.28 X 10-2 X 10-2 
4 With a slightly larger value of K, K ~ 7.5 X 10 , we obtain 
:" ~ ref!\lits in Table 4.4, which satisfy the mission allocation. The 
optimal fly-by altitudes are sharply defined when the temperature reading 
is high (T ~ Tl ). When the temperature reading is low (T ~ T2) and the 
81 
J 
i 
" , 
"' -"7: •.• -.':-;i' . ;\~ "_, 
00 
N 
State Temperature 
of Reading 
Nature T 
1 Tl 
2 Tl 
3 T2 
4 T2 
* 
Table 4.3 
OPTIMAL GANYMEDE FLY-BY ALTITUDE DECISION 
SECOND ITERATION: CONTAMINATION PENALTY K = S X 104 
State Ganymede Probabili ty 
of Probability Fly-by of 
Guidance of State Altitude Probability Contamination 
System of Nature Decision of Impact Given Impact 
G r (T, G) H (!em) Pi Pr;; 
Gl 0.49S 47S Z X 10-
3 1.0 
G2 O.OOS 1240 7 X 10-
3 1.0 
~ 
Gl 0.49S negative 
1.0" 0.01 
~ 
G2 O.OOS negative 1.0" 0.01 
Probability of 
Contamination 
Conditional Total 
p.qp rp.qp 
({o-f) 1 c 
_(1O- S) 
2.0 0.99 
7.0 0.03 
~ ". 10.0" 4.9S" 
10.0* O.OS* 
Prior probability of contamination p(C) ~ 6 X 1O-S 
These numbers depend critically on the value assigned to the outcome of a successful emergency 
maneuver to remove the spacecraft from impact trajectory. More realistic values would require 
further refinements of the current model. 
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Table 4.4 
OPTIMAL GANYMEDE FLY-BY ALTITUDE DECISiON 
THIRD ITERATION: CONTAMINATION PENALTY K = 7.5 X 10
4 
Ganymede Probability 
Probability of 
State of Probability Fly-by of 
Contamination 
State Temperature Guidance of State Altitude Probability Contaminat
ion Conditional Total 
of Reading System of Nature Decision of Impact Given Impac
t PiqPc rPiqPc 
Nature T G r (T, G) H(km) Pi Pc (10
-5) ( 10-5) 
1 TI GI 0.495 
487 1.5 X 10-3 1.0 1.5 0.74 
2 Tl G2 0.005 
1260 6 X 10-3 1.0 6.0 0.03 
3 T2 Gl 0.495 
175 0.25 0.01 2.5 1.24 
~ 10.0* 0.05* 
4 T2 G2 0
.005 negative 1.0" 0.01 
Prior probability of contamination p(C) ~ 2 X 10-5 
* These numbers depend critically on the value assigned t~ the outcome of a suc
cessful emergency 
maneuver to remove the spacecraft from impact trajectory. More realistic values ,;ould require 
further refinements of the current model. 
--.. ~ .. -.----'--. .....'! .~--~~'~-----~,-~ ...... --.-~.--~-----" 
i--~~~_ 
; ~ 
~,,: 
optical guidance system is available (G = Gl ), the optimal fly-by alti-
tude is very 10'" (175 km) and corresponds to a flat optimum. When the 
temperature reading is 10'" (T = T2) and only the radio guidance sysrem 
is available (G = G2), the fly-by altitude can be chosen arbitrarily 10"'; 
"'ith the value assignments of this illustration, it is even preferable to 
aim for an impact and plan to resort to an emergency maneuver. 
The probabilities of contamination conditional upLn each state 
of nature are found in the penultimate column of Table 4.4. These numbers 
should have been the probability suballocations for each decision if a 
suballocation procedure had been used. 
4.3 Sketch of a JO Planetary Quarantine Analysis 
4.3.1 Structure of the Mission 
The planetary quarantine of the JO mission can be divided into 
three phases: the insertion maneuver, the exploration of the Jovian sys-
tem "'ith multiple satellite encounters, and the disposal of the spacecraft 
(see Figure 4.6). Each phase raises specific planetary quarantine prob-
lems. 
The critical decisions for the insertion maneuver are the choice 
of a satellite for gravitational assistance and the choice of a fly-by 
altitude. We analyzed the second problem in Section 4.2, assuming that 
Ganymede had been selected for gravitational assistance, a logical but 
not necessary choice. Regardless of the choice of satellite, large 
quantities of fuel can be saved b,y flying by at a 1m" altitude. The 
major trade-off is therefore bet",een fuel conservation and risk of con-
taminati0n inherent in a close fly-by. 
There is a large number of promising strategies for exploring the 
Jovian system, and the planning is still in a rapidly evolving stage. 
Ho",ever, tl"O planetary quarantine issues can already be perceived in all 
thE strategies proposed thus far. 
One 
desired to 
is a minor issue: 
modify rapidly the 
Some important changes of velocity "'ill be 
spacecraft 
serve fuel and save time, these velocity 
bys of some of the Galilean satellites. 
orbit characteristics. To con-
changes "'ill require close fly-
These problems are comparable 
in nature to the choice of fly-by altitude for the insertion maneuver 
but do not have the same magnitude. 
84 
I 
I 
1 
I j 
, I 
I 
II i 
,r' 
j 
i 
- j 
, i 
I 
I 
11 
i 
I 
I 
-00 
'" 
FIGURE 4.6 
JUPITER ORBITER MISSION PHASES 
DECISIONS: 
• Choice of Satellite 
for Gravitational Assist 
-+ 
• Choice of C!. V 
I 
INSERTION INTO 
JUPITER ORBIT 
DECISIONS: 
• Multiple Encounter 
Choices 
II 
EXPLORATION OF 
JOVIAN SYSTEM 
DECISIONS: 
• Choice of Disposal 
Method 
III 
DISPOSAL OF 
SPACECRAFT 
STATE VARIABLES 
RelATIVE TO : 
STATE VARIABLES 
RELATIVE TO : 
• Spacecraft • Spacecraft 
• Trajectory • Trajectory 
• Planetology • Planetology 
VA 
MI: 
CD 
(!) 
LUE OF THE 
SION INCLUDING 
NTAMINATION PENALTY 
--- -"-,,, 
j: 
, 
j 
The other issue is critical: If control of the spacecraft trajec-
tory is lost during the exploration phase, the spacecraft is very likely 
to impact one of the major bodies of the Jovian system sometime during 
the planetary quarantine period [15]. Given the current design estimates 
of spacecraft reliability and the probabilities of contamination if the 
spacecraft impacts on the Galilean satellites, the prior probability of 
contamination of the exploration phase exceeds by far the contemplated 
mission allocation. Hence, the need for an emergency disposal alternative. 
The spacecraft disposal problem appears again in the third phase 
of the mission, but this time under standard circumstances, i.e., with 
complete control of the spacecraft. A standard disposal alternative must 
be found to guarantee that the probability of contamination will be kept 
belm. the mission allocation for the duration of the planetary quarantine 
period. 
We shall review successively the third and the second phase of the 
JO mission. 
4.3.2 The Third Phase: Disposal of the Spacecraft 
Many alternatives are available for disposing of th~ spacecraft 
"hile it still remains under control. An attempt to rank some of these 
alternatives according to their expected net values and their fuel re-
quirements is illustrated in Figure 4.7. For example, the alternative 
of injecting the spacecraft in an orbit that "ill have a negligible 
chance of impacting a body of biological interest may have the highest 
scientific value and the lowest contamination penalty. However, it may 
be one of the most fuel-demanding alternatives and may therefore require 
an early termination of the exploration phase. At the other extreme, 
crashing into one of the Galilean satellites may be the most easily 
achievable outcome, but it is the lcast preferred from a planetary 
quarantine point of view. 
Between these extremes there is a large number of alternatives 
with different values and fuel requirements; for example, crashing on a 
polar cap of a Galilean satellite, injecting into a circular orbit within 
Io's orbit, crashing on Jupiter or on a dead satellite, and so forth. 
can be 
Mathematically, the selection of a standard disposal alte""ative 
formulated as follows: 
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DETERMINATION OF OPTIMAL STANDARD 
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Let d = a disposal decision 
v(d) = 
p . (d) = 
J 
the expected scientific value of dispnsal decision d 
the probability of contaminating planet j given the 
disposal decision d 
Kj = the contamination penalty for planet j 
6V(d) = the propulsive change of velocity requirement for 
disposal decision d 
6V = the 
M for 
propulsive change of velocity still available 
disposal. 
Then, the problem is to maximize over all disposal alternatives the ex-
pected net value, the maximization being constrained by the 6V availa-
bility, Le., 
maximize 
d 
subject to 
m 
v(d) - '""' K.p.(d) £.-J J J 
j=l 
6V(d) ,. 6V 
M 
(4-10) 
Alternatively, the fuel constraint can be 
jective function by pricing the 6V ""ailabiHty. 
of a 6V unit, the alternative formulation is 
introduced into the ob-
Letting ~ be the price 
m 
maximize v(d) - l: Kl/d) - KV6V(d) 
j=l 
(4-11) 
The price KV will be chosen in an iterative manner so that the 6V con-
straint for the entire mission will be met. 
We shall denote by v3 the expected net value for the optimal dis-
posal decision. According to Eq. (4-11), v3 is a function of 6VM 
[Figure 4. 7 shO\~s two illustrative plots of v3 (6VM) conditional upon 
two states of the guidance systeml. According to Eq. (4-11), v3 is a 
function of ~. 
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4.3.3 The Second Phase: Multiple Encounters 
4.3.3.1 The Probability of Contamination 
The structure of the retargeting decision problem faced at each 
encounter "'ith a Jovian satellite is depicted in Figure 4.8. If the main 
propulsion system fails (probability f), the spacecraft is likely to 
crash onto a Galilean satellite sometime during the planetary quarantine 
period. The corresponding probability of contamination is represented by 
Pc' If the main propulsion system does not fail, the retargeting maneu-
ver will result in a probability of immediate impact p .. An emergency ~ 
maneuver has a probability q of removing the spacecraft from an impact 
trajectory. The probability of contamination for one encounter is 
therefore 
p(C) ; fp + (1 - f)p.qp 
c ~ c 
We shall simplify and extend this result to a sequence of n 
encounters by assuming that: 
(4-12) 
(1) All the probabilities of contamination given impact are 
approximately equal. 
(2) The probabilities f, Pi' and q are small. 
The probability of contamination for n encounters is then approximately 
p(C) =- n(f + P.q)p 
~ c 
(4-13) 
where (f + p.q) is the total probability of impact at each encounter and ~ 
Pc is still the probability of contamination given impact. 
A limitation of p(C) to 1 X 10-
5 
will impose strict constraints 
On the probability of impact, i.e., on the spacecraft's reliability (p,q) 
and on the guidance strategy (n, P.). 1. 
4.3.3.2 Determination of the Probability of Contamination Given Impact, Pc
 
The assessment of the probability of contamination given impact 
depends on the spacecraft bioload, the release and transportation mecha-
nisms on the impacted planet of the terrestrial organiSms, and the 
planet's environme~t. Simplified models of contamination given impact 
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PROBABILITY OF CONTAMINATION FOR ONE ENCOUNTER 
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sununarize these factors by two quantities: the expected number N of 
viable organisms released on the planet and the probability of growh p 
of each of these organisms. The probability of contamination given im~ 
pact can then be computed by taking the product of these quantities (see 
a discussion of the Sagan-Coleman formula in [16]), that is, 
p = N X P 
c g 
(4-14) 
This equation assumes, among other things, that each organism 
has an independent chance of survival Pg. A different result would be 
obtained with the opposite assumption of complete dependence: All orga-
nisms will survive and proliferate \qith probability p or die. The de-
termination of p may be extremely sensitive to the c~oice of assumption 
c 
as illustrated in Figure 4.9. 
For example, assuming that the probability of growth on Jupiter 
is 1 X 10-7 and that the spacecraft bioload is 1 X 105, the probability 
of contamination given impact may be as high as 1 X 10-2 or as 10lq as 
1 X 10-7• The probability of contamination given impact on a Galilean 
satellite, assuming that p = 0.1, is, of course, much less sensitive 
to the dependence assumptigns: p will always- be between 0.1 and 1. If 
c ' 
Pg for the Galilean satellites is revised do\qnwards, sensitivity to the 
dependence assumptions may be significant, as with Jupiter. 
4.3.3.3 Constraints on Spacecraft Reliability and Guidance Strategy 
Based on Eq. (4-14), the probability of impact at each maneuver 
has been plotted against the ratio p(C)/pc in Figure 4.10. Each plot in 
Figure 4.10 corresponds to a given number of encounters. Thus, if p(C) = 
1 X 10-5 , Pc = 0.5, and (f + Piq) = 1 X 10-5 , \qe can read in Figure 4.10 
that no more than two encounters are permissible. However, current esti-
mates of the spacecraft reliability are no better than f = 1 X 10-2 to 
1 X 10-4 l~ith these values, no encounter is permissible. Of course, the 
mission allocation may be raised, the probabilities of contamination 
given impact may be revised downward, and the spacecraft reliabi1ity may 
be improved. However, considerable modification of these parameters would 
be required to permit. a reasonable number of encounters. 
4.3.3.4 Desirable Characteristics of an Emergency Disposal System 
Assuming that the reliability of the main propulsion system can-
not be greatly iniproved, an emergency disposal system must be deSigned. 
The characterization of such a system is beyond the scope 'cif this project, 
but we can describe two of its main specifications: the probab'ility tha,t 
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FEASIBLE PROBABILITIES OF IMPACT PER ENCOUNTER 
FOR MULTIPLE-ENCOUNTERS 
o .------.-----.------.------r------r-----,-~~~ 
-1 
-2 
-3 
-4 
-5 
-6 
-7 
-7 
UNFEASIBLE 
REGION 
n = number of 
encounters 
-6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 
Log of Ratio of Contamination Requirement over Probability of 
Contamination Given Impact: p(C)/pc 
93 
o 
I 
I 
--1 
I 
.J~ __ ~~ 
this system t~ill fail f I and the probability of contamination given that 
it functions successfully p' (see Figure 4.11). 
c 
We shall also use the following notations! 
Q = the probability of contamination of the multiple 
encounter phase 
the probability that the main propulsion system 
will fail sometime during the multiple-encounter 
phase 
Pc = the probability of contamination given failure of 
the emergency dispo.sal system. 
The emergency disposal system must then be designed so that 
f"[ f 'p c + (1 - f')p I c1 < Q (4,,15) 
or approximately (with f I « 1) 
p = 
c 
f"(f'pc + pIC) < Q 
Typical parameter values are: 
0.5. Then Eq. (4-16) becomes 
f I + 2 I < 4 X 10-4 p c 
(4-16) 
0.01, and 
(4-17) 
That is, the probability of failure of the emergency disposal system as 
well as the probability of contamination given successful disposal must 
be on the order of 10-4 • 
4.3.3.5 Determination of Optimal Guidance Strategy for Multiple 
Encounters 
The determination of the optimal guidance strategy for the 
multiple-encounter phase can be formulated in the same way as that of the 
third phase. In particular, there are two possibilities: (1) a con-
strained optimum formulation with a constraint on the available propulsive 
velocity change, and (2) a Lagrangian formulation with a Lagrange.multi_ 
plier KV' The expected net value of the optimal disposal strategy, v3, 
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FIGURE 4.11 
REQUIREMENTS FOR AN EMERGENCY DISPOSAL SYSTEM 
Probability of 
Contamination 
a :::: f" (f'jJ + p' ) 
• • 
Probability of Failure 
of the Main Propulsion 
System During the 
Multiple Encounter Phase 
(I" ) 
RELIABILITY 
ANALYSIS 
TYPICAL NUMERICAL VALUES: 
a = 2 x 10-5 \ 
f" = 0.1 and 
p. = 0.5 therefore If' "" 1 x 10-4 x 10-4 p'. "" 1 
Success (1-1 ') 
EMERGENCY 
DISPOSAL SYSTEM 
Failure (I') 
p'. 
p. 
Probability of Contamination 
Given Successful Emergency 
Disposal 
PLANETARY 
CONTAMINATION 
ANAL YSIS 
Probability of Contamination 
Given Failure of the Main 
Propulsion System and of the 
Emergency Disposal System 
L 
I 
L 
~ 
I 
I 
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is assumed to be known. The only difficulty iG in the dimensionality of 
the problem and the large number of probability and value assessments 
that must be made. 
The expected net value of the optimal strategy for the second 
and third phases of the JO mission can be denoted by vl • This is the 
value function that toe have directly assessed in Table 4.1 and Figure 4.4 
to analyze the insertion maneuver. 
96 
J 
1 
I 
1 
! 
, I 
--11! 
Appendix 
SOME SHORTCOMINGS OF THE CHANCE-CONSTRAINED 
FORMULATION OF PLANETARY QUARANTINE 
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Appendix 
SOME SHORTCOMINGS OF THE CRANCE-CONSTRAINED 
FORMULATION OF PLANETARY QUARANTINE 
A.l Irreconcilability of Chance-Constraints and Expected 
Utility Theory 
The selection of space exploration programs subject to current 
planetary quarantine requirements can be summarized as follows: Find 
the space exploration program having the maximum expected value provided 
that the probability of planetary contamination be less than or equal to 
a given number Q. 
In mathematical formulation, 
maximize 
HI 
subject to 
f v(x) dF i (x) 
xeX 
f 
xec 
dF. (x) ,. Q 
~ 
(A-l) 
(A-2) 
where x is a complete description of a space program outcome; Fi(x) is 
the cumulative distribution of outcomes corresponding to program i; C is 
the set of outcomes entailing contamination, a subset of the set of all 
possible outcomes X; and v(x) is a value function assessed by the decision 
maker over the set of possible outcomes. 
Problems of the form (A-l) and (A-2) are known in mathematical pro-
gramming as chance-constrained problems. A prospect of outcomes x with 
probability distribution F(x) is often referred to as a lottery. 
An alternative formulation is to represent all the decision makers' 
preferences, including the risk and consequences of contamination by a 
utility function u(x) , and to maximize the unconstrained expected utility, 
i.e., 
I'RECEDf;\iG- PAm!} BLANK Nott FILMEiD 
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maximize 
HI 
j u(x) 
xex 
dF. (x) 
1. 
(A-3) 
Hot.ever, we shall prove now that a chance-constrained formulation 
with a positive probability constraint is inconsistent with the existence 
of a ut·ility function. 
Consider two space exploration programs (or lotteries) Ll and LZ (see Figure A.l) having expected values Vl and Vz [computed from Eq. (A-l)] 
and probabilities of contamination ql and qz [computed from Eq.(A-Z)] such 
that· 
(A-4) 
q > Q > q 1 Z (A-5) 
According to th~ chance-constrained formulation, the first program has a 
larger expected value than the second but must be rejected in favor of 
the second because its probability of contamination ql exceeds the chance 
constraint. 
The expected utility formulation will lead to the same preference 
ordering between Ll and LZ if and only if the expected utility Uz of LZ' 
computed from Eq. (A-3), is larger than the expected utility Ul of Ll , 
namely, 
(A-6) 
Let us nOw construct a new program L3 in the follot.ing manner: 
First, consider a random event E; if the random event occurs (probability 
p), we proceed with program LV whereas if the random event does .not 
occur [probability (l-p)], we proceed with program LZ. The expected 
value and probability of contamination of program L3 are therefore 
(A-7) 
(A-B) 
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FIGURE A.1 
CHANCE-CONSTRAINED PREFERENCE ORDERING 
OF SPACE EXPLORATION PROGRAMS 
IACCEPTI 
MORE 
PREFERRED 
p 
(l-p) 
'---L2 
L3/ 
------;tf 
I 
,//, 
/ I 
LESS // I 
PREFERRED / I 
V
2 
___
 .... ( I 
I 2 I 
I I 
I I 
o q2 q3 0. q1 
PROBABILITY OF CONTAMINATION 
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Nm~, since q > Q > qz' it is always possible to find p > 0 so that 
q3 <Q, i.e., so Bnat program L3 meets the chance-constraint. [For 
example, choosing p = (l/Z)CQ - qz)/(ql - qz) will give q3 = (l/Z)(Q + Qz) 
< Q.] The availability of a random event E with the appropriate proba-
bility p is assumed for the sake of the argument. 
From Eq. (A-4) , (A-7), and p > 0 We can see that 
(A-9) 
and, therefore, program L3 will be preferred to program LZ' according to 
the chance-constrained formulation. 
However, the expected utility of program L3 is 
, (A-IO) 
and since U
z 
> Ul ' a positive p implies 
(A-ll) 
That is, program LZ should be preferred to program L3 on an expected 
utility basis. The preference orderings of space exploration programs 
resulting from a chance-constrained formulation and from expected 
utility theory may not only differ, but may differ in a way that cannot 
be resolved by a mere respecification of a utility function. 
When the chance-constraint Q is nil, 1. e., when even the slightest 
chance of contamination is rejected, utility theory can explain the 
preference ordering of chance-constrained programs. It suffices to as-
sign an infinite negative utility to contamination 'outcomes. 
A.2 The Violation of TIOO Axioms of Utility Theory by Chance-Constraints 
Expected utility theory is founded on a set of intuitive and widely 
accepted axioms (for example, see [10], Section Z.5). Chance-constraints 
may also seem intuitive at first, but must be recognized as an arbitrary 
decision procedure. The irreconciliability of the two approaches is not 
surprising in vie\~ of the fact that chance-constraints violate the two 
follolOing axioms of utility theory: 
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(1) Continuity--A decision maker preferring alternative L3 
to L2 and L2 to Ll «ill be indifferent to the choice 
beo<een having alternative L2 or having the possibility 
to play some lottery involving just Ll and L3• 
(2) Monotonicity--If t«o lotteries involve the same t«o 
alternatives, a decision maker «ill prefer the lottery 
offering the most preferred alternative «ith the higher 
probability. 
We shall nolO demonstrate that chance-constraints violate these t«o 
axioms. 
A.2.1 Axiom 1: Uontinuity 
As before, we denote by Vi and q. the expected value and proba-
bility of contamination associated withkalternative L . Q is a positive i' 
chance-constraint. 
that 
Consider three alternatives Ll , L2, and L3 (see Figure A.2) such 
ql > Q > q3 and q2 (A-12) 
V3 >V 2 (A-13) 
Vl > V + 2 (V -2 C -Q) V3) Ql_ q3 (A-14) 
(Note: Vl > V2 would do, a fortiori, and «ould simplify the demonstration.) 
Then L3 is preferred to L2, «hich is preferred to Ll' The characteristics 
of a lottery bet«een Ll «ith probability p and L3 with probability (1 - p) 
are 
V = pVl + (1 - p)V3 (A-IS) 
q = pql + (1 - P)q3 (A-16) 
There are t«o possibilities: If q > Q, the lottery is unacceptable, and 
L~ is preferred to the lottery; if q ~ Q, the lottery is acceptable. 
Gkven inequalities (A-12) and (A-l3), we see that 
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FIGURE A.2 
VIOLATION OF THE AXIOM OF CONTINUITY 
BY CHANCE CONSTRAINTS 
V2 
V, 
L -
IACCEPTI 
MORE 
PREFERRED 
(1 - p) 
"----LJ 
q2 qJ Q q, 
PROBABILITY OF CONTAMINATION 
NOTE: In this illustration L3 is preferred to L2• which is preferred to L" However. 
any lottery L between L, and LJ is either more desirable than L2 or less 
desirable than L2; No lottery L is equally desirable as L2, 
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3 Q - q3 "' (V -2 
V) -,,1::.-_ (q -q) 3 q - q3 
and, therefore, from (A-14) and (A-l7) 
V
l 
> V + (V -2 2 (q -q) V) . ..,..,1,,--_ 3 q - q3 
(A-ln 
(A-1S) 
Substituting (A-16) for q in (A-1S) and the right side of (A-1S) for Vl in (A-1S), we obtain, after simplification, 
V> V 
2. 
That is, the lottery is preferred to L
2
. 
(A-19) 
There is no lottery bet"een Ll and L3 such that the decision maker 
I.ould be indifferent bet"een having L2 or having the possibility to play 
the lottery. 
A.2.2 Axiom 2: Monotonicity 
Consider two alternatives Ll and L2 such that 
(A-20) 
, (A-2l) 
i.e., Ll is unacceptable and Li is preferred to Ll • 
The characteristics of a lottery betl.een Ll "ith probabilityp 
andL
2 
with probability (1 - p) are 
(A-22) 
(A~23) 
Cons",quently, V and q increase linearly I.ith p. It is therefore possible 
to findtloo lotteriesL I and L"I.ith pI> p" such that 
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v > Vi > V" > V 
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preferred to L", although L2 
probability of obtaining L2 • 
(A-24) 
, (A-2S) 
d II is preferred to Ll an L offers 
A.3 Chance-Constraints and the Negative Value of Information 
The intuitive appeal of a set of axioms is always debatable; it may 
be more enlightening to explore some of the consequences of rejecting the 
axioms. Thus we shall show nm~ that rejecting the 'lxioms of expected 
utility theory and adopting instead chance-constrait>ts can lead to a 
distasteful consequence: If a space exploration prog~am is selected 
using chance-constraints. information pertinent to the program may have 
a negative expected value. 
Consider the fly-by mission depicted in Figure A.3. This mission 
has a structure similar to program L3, described above, that is, n~o 
states of r,ature may prevail. In this instance, free water may be present 
on the target planet ,~ith probability 0.4 or be absent with probability 
0.6. If free water is present, the probability of contamination given 
impact is 1.0, whereas it is only 0.01 otherwise. The only decision is 
to launch or to forego the mission. If the mission is flown, the proba-
bility of impact is 2 X 10-4 • The mission allocation is assumed to be 
1 X 10-4• We shall analyze the effect of receiving perfect information 
about the presence or absence of free water prior to the launching de-
cision (1) when chance-constraints are used to make the decision (2) when 
the decision is based on expected utilities. 
A.3.l Chance-Constrained Formulation 
For simplicity, a scientific value of 100 (in millions ofddllars, 
if you Will) has been assigued to a successful mission. A scientific 
value of zero has been assigned to the other two possibilities: crash 
or nO launch. The analysis could have been carried out with more refined 
values distinguishing bet,~een these last two outcomes or conditional upon 
the presence of free water, or both. 
when 
Figure 
only the 
A.3 (a) represents the analysis of the launching decision 
prior probability about the presence, of free water is 
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FIGURE A.3 
CHANCE-CONSTRAINED FORMULATION OF A SINGLE-DECISION 
FLY-BY MISSION WITH ONE UNCERTAIN STATE VARIABLE 
LAUNCH 
Ves 
No 
I [O~II 
WATER 
No (0.6) 
[2 x 10-61 
100 
CONTAMINATION 
Ves [2 x 10-41 
No (- 1.0) 
Ves [2 x 10-61 
No (-1.0) 
(a) WITHOUT INFORMATION ABOUT PRESENCE OF WATER 
VALUE 
• 
100 
• 
100 
o 
WATER lAUNCH CONTAMINATION VALUE 
Ves [2 x 10-41 
Ves 
Ves (0.4) 
No (1.0) 
No 
Ves 
No (0.6) 
No (1.0) 
No 
1[00011 
(b) WITH INFORMATION ABOUT PRESENCE OF WATER 
D = Decision node; 0 == Chance node; *::: Contamination; () = Pro bability: 
[ I = Probability 01 contamination; _ = Expected value 
D Boxes contain the results of solving the tree 
• 
100 
o 
• 
100 
o 
NOTE : Infor mation about the presence or absence of water diminishes the expected value of the m
ission. 
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knOl<U. The probability of contamination associated with the mission is 
equal to 
Pr •. (water) X Pr. (Impact) X Pr. (Contamination given impact and water) + 
Pr. (Np water) X Pr. (Impact) X Pr. (Contamination given impact and 
no water) = 
(0.4) , (2 X 1O~4) X (1.) 
+ (0.6) X (2 X lO~4) X (10~2) 
= 8 X 10~5 
The expected scientific value, computed in the same manner, is 
approximately equal to 100. Since the mission is acceptable (probability 
of contamination smaller than 1 X 10~4) and has obviously a greater value 
than no mission at all, the decision is to launch. 
Figure A.3 (b) represents the analysis o·f the same mission t,ith 
the opportunity to obtain perfect information about the eventual presence 
of free water on the target planet prior tp launch. With probability 0.6, 
the indication will be that there is no free water. A rapid inspection 
shOlvs that, under this condition, the mission is acceptable and has an 
expected value of 100. However, with probability 0.4, the indication 
will be that there is free water on the target planet. In this case, the 
mission would cause contamination Hith probability 2 X 10-
4 and ·,u1d 
therefore have to be rejected. The expected value of the proj,'.ct with 
the opportunity of receiving perfect information is therefore 
100 X 0.6 + 0 X 0.4 = 60 
The mission manager should actually be Hilling to sacrifice up to 
40 percent of the total scientific value of the mission to reject the op-
portunity of knotving whether or not there is free Hater on the target 
planet! 
A.3.2 Expected Utility Formulation 
The aberration of a negative value of information cannot emerge 
from a,L expected utility formulation. Figure A.4 illustrates the same 
mission with an extremely negative value of -750000 assigned to the con-
tamination outcomes in order to reproduce the same strategies as with the 
chance~constrained formulation. 
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FIGURE A.4 
EXPECTED VALUE FORMULATION OF A SINGLE-DECISION 
FLY-BY MISSION WITH ONE UNCERTAIN STATE VARIABLE 
LAUNCH WATER CONTAMINATION VALUE 
Ves (2 x 10-41 
-750,000 
No H.O) 100 
-750,000 
No (0.6) 
No H .O) 
100 
1(000]1 
o 
(a) WITHOUT INFORMATION ABOUT PRESENCE OF WATER 
WATER LAUNCH CONTAMINATION VALUE 
Ves (2 x 10-4] 
-750,000 
Ves 
(2 x 10-4) No (- 1.0) 100 
-50 Ves (0.4) 
No 0 
Ves (2 x 10-6) 
Ves 
-750,000 
(2 x W 6) No H.O) 100 98.5 
No 0 
(b) WITH INFORMATION ABOUT PRESENC E OF WATER 
D = Decision node; 0 = Chance node; * = Contamination; () = Probability; 
( ( = Probability of conta",ination; _ = Expected value; 
D Boxes contain the results of solving the tree 
NOTE: Information about the presence or absence of water raises the expected value of the missio
n 
(positive value of information) , 
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The analysisshOl~S that wi.thout prior information about the presence 
of "ater the best decision is to launch; the expected value is only 39.1 
because the contamination event has been penalized. On the other hand, 
with perfect information, the expected value of the project is 59 .• 1. 
Therefore, a positive value of 20 (in millions of dollars, if you '~ill) 
can be derived from the opportunity of receiving perfect information 
about the eventual presence of water. More generally, the expected value 
or inrormation, derived in the context or an expected value analysis, 
will be a useful indication for the design of data gathering systems. 
If necessary,· the decision maker's attitude toward risk can be 
taken into account by applying a transformation to the value scale. 
(See, for example, Luce and Raiffa [10] for a definition of utility 
scales.) 
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